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Defenses for the Sanctuary Movement: A 
Humanitarian Plea Falling Upon Deaf Ears 
"Remember always to welcome strangers,jor by doing this, some people have entertained 
angels without knowing it." 
-Heb. 13:2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, thousands of Guatamalan and Salvadoran refugees fleeing 
death and persecution in their homelands have sought refuge in the United 
States. l Those requesting political asylum at the border face regular denial of 
their applications by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), often 
without an investigation or hearing. 2 Of the approximately ten thousand five 
hundred Guatamalan and Salvadoran refugees whose asylum applications were 
received by the United States in the past three recorded fiscal years, only five 
percent received favorable rulings." 
With little hope of obtaining political asylum through legal mechanisms, many 
refugees have forsaken official channels and look to the Sanctuary Movement 
for help." The Sanctuary Movement began as a loosely knit group of concerned 
church leaders who felt compelled to aid those Central American refugees 
whom the U.S. government had denied emergency immigration reliefS Today, 
the Movement has grown into a nationwide effort involving more than three 
I See infra text accompanying notes 104-17. 
, Helton. Ecumenical. Municipal and Legal Challenges 10 Uniled Siaies Refugee Policy, 21 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 493, 499 (1986). A refugee at the boarder of the United States is not technically within 
its territory and, therefore, may be denied admittance by the government with little regard for his or 
her due process rights. G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 74-76 (1983). See, 
e.g., infra note 167. 
S See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1984 STATISTICAl. YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATU-
RALIZATION SERVICE 77 (1984); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1985 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 74 (1985); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1986 STATISTICAL 
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 49 (1986); see aLIO Helton, Political 
Asylum under Ihe 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243, 253 (1984). Aliens 
from communist countries are frequently admitted, often without legal justification, while refugees 
from nations friendly with the United States are regularly rejected despite the poor human rights 
records of their home countries. [d. at 253-54. 
4 R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, SANCTUARY; THE NEW UNDERGROUND RAIl.ROAD 41-48 (1986). 
5 See infra Section IliA. 
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hundred church congregations and humanitarian groups." Over one thousand 
Gljatamalans and Salvadorans have received refuge in the United States due to 
the efforts of the Sanctuary Movement. 7 
In 1981, tqe Sanctuary Movement became the object of INS investigations." 
The result of these investigations has been a series of prosecutions against 
sanctuary wor~ers for violqtions of federal law prohibiting the bringing in, 
transporting, or harboring of illegal aliens." In order to defend themselves 
qgains~ federal indictments, sanctuary workers have constructed defenses bflsed 
on international principles of human rights. llI To date, the courts considering 
the sanctuary cases have failed to recognize these defenses. II 
This COIT)ment concentrates on the defenses offered by sanctuary workers 
which are based on non-re/iJUlement, a principle prohibiting a state from sending 
refugees back to territories where they would suffer persecution. 12 The second 
section of this Comment defines the principle of non-refoulement and trates its 
development in international law. ll The third section begins with a review of 
nou-refoulement in U.S. law and concludes with a critique of the courts' treatment 
of the non-refoulement-based defenses offered by the sanctuary workers in a 
number of recent cases. 11 This Comment will suggest that the courts' failure to 
recognize non-refoulement-based defenses is contrary to both international and 
domestic law. I, 
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF NOlv-REFOULEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 







where their lives 
7 Helton. supra note 2. at 493. 
, See mfra Section lilA. 










II See, Lfi., Cnited States Y. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1581 (S.D. Tex. 1985); Cnited States v. Merkt, 
764 F.2d 266, 272-73 (5th Cir. 198.1)); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 964-65 (5th Cir. 1986), 
mi. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1603 (1987). 
"This definition corresponds to the language of article 33(1) of the Cnited !';ations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33(1), 19 U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 
V.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. See infra text accompanying notes 57-59 for an analysis 
of this provision. 
,:I Sff mfra Section II. 
'I See infra Section Ill. 
", See mfra Sections IIIC and IV. 
Hi In most instances, "territory" will mean the refugee's country of origin. However, the choice of 
the word "territory" was deliberate, and evidences the drafter's intent to broaden the scope of the 
principle to enLompass a \\i'icier variety of situations. Thus, a state may not deport refugees to any 
territorv, whether it be their homeland, land of last residence, or any country where they may face 
1989] DEFENSES FOR THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT 227 
ized. I7 Thus, non-refoulement guarantees refugees the right of temporary refuge 
in the host state until they can safely return to their country of origin or until 
they are granted political asylum in another state. I8 Commentators agree that 
non-refoulement is a well-established principle of international common law. I9 
This common law seeks to guarantee such fundamental human rights as the 
freedom of movement,~O the right to a nationality,~1 and the freedom from 
inhumane treatment.~~ The protection of basic human rights is the goal and 
substance of numerous international agreements.~:l Because many of these 
loss of life or freedom. Nor maya country deport a refugee to a state "where there is a reasonable 
basis to believe that he would be returned subsequently to the country were he fears persecution."' 
Goldman & Martin, International Legal Standm'ds Relating to the Rights of A liens and Refugees and the United 
States Immigration Law, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 302. 313. Sef, e.g., 1951 Convention, supra note 12, at art. 33. 
17 The scope of non-refoulement protection is dependent upon the meaning of the term "refugee." 
Thus, in order to understand a particular definition of non-refoulement, the corresponding definition 
of refugee must be considered as well. See generallv notes 23-24, 47-49, 60-64 and accompanying 
text. 
IK "Non-refoulement incorporates the right of temporary refuge. That means one has a right to stay 
in a place of refuge until the situation in the country of origin warrants return." Parker, Human Rights 
and Humanit",';an Law, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 675, 679 (1985). See a/so G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, 
at 119 ("Admission on a temporary basis, especially in situations of large-scale influx, remains an 
inescapable fact of life, and is practiced by states throughout the world."). 
IY See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
2() Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(lll), U.N. Doc. A/811, at art. 13 (1948). 
2I/d. at art. 15. 
22 /d. at art. 5. The rights mentioned above are not dependant upon race, sex, l2nguage, religion, 
nationality, or national statu •. Final An of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
reprinted in 73 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 323, 325 (1975); American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HANDBOOK OF EXISTING 
RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/ser. L./V.l11.60, doc. 28 
rev. I, at 21 (1983) [hereinafter American Declaration]. For an extensive list of fundamental human 
rights, see American Declaration, supra, at 22-26; Universal Declaration of HUman Rights, supra note 
20, at arts. 1-30. 
23 See, e.g., Hague Convention of 1907 Part IV, 36 Stat. 2277, 2279, T.S. No. 539, at 5, B.F.S.P. 338 
(1910) ("Animated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme case, the interests of humanity and the 
ever progressive needs of civilization .... "); U.N. CHARTER preamble ("[T]o reaffirm faith in funda-
mental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women .... "); The American Declaration, supra note 22, at preamble ("All men are born free and 
equal, in dignity and in rights, and, being endowed by nature with reason and conscience, they should 
conduct themselves as brothers one to another."); Charter of the Organization of American States, 
Apr. 30, 1948, art. 5U), 2 U.S.T. 2416, 2418, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, at 5, 119 V.N.T.S. 3, 54 ("The 
American States proclaim the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, 
nationality, creed or sex."); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 20 ("[I]t is essential, if 
man is not to be compelled to have recourse ... to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that 
human rights should be protected by the rule of law."); Geneva Convention of 1949, art. 3(1), 6 V.S.T. 
3516,3518, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, at 4,75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32 ("Persons taking no active part in the hostilities 
... shall in all circumstances be treated humanely without any adverse distinction founded upon race, 
color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth .... "); Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 
1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Annex I (Agenda Item 64) at 16-17, U.N. Doc. A/4249, at preamble 
(1959) ("[M]ankind owes to the child the best it has to give .... "); International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 
preamble (1966) (,,[R]ecognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
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agreements rely on the principle of non-refoulement as a means of protecting 
fundamental human rights, commentators consider it an unconditional right to 
which every refugee is entitled.24 
B. Non-Refoulement in International Law Prior to the Formation of the United 
Nations 
1. Early History 
The principle of non-refoulement IS a contemporary concept. 25 The principle 
did not make its first appearance until the middle 1800s.26 An early example of 
a non-refoulement provision found in the United Kingdom's Aliens Act of 1905 
granted those fleeing political or religious persecution leave to land on British 
soil despite "want of means, or the probability of [the alien] becoming a [public] 
charge .... "27 This provision, like other early articulations of non-refoulement, 
was not comprehensive. Moreover, subsequent development of the principle 
itself was slow and sporadic. Non-refoulement was not formally articulated in an 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world .... "); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at preamble (1966) (,,[It is] the obligation of states ... to 
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms .... "). 
24 Hassan, Panacea or Mirage? Domestic Enforcement of International Human Rights Law: Recent Cases, 4 
Hous. J. INT'L L. 13,21 (1981). See also Martin, Non-Refoulement of Refugees: United States Compliance 
with International Obligations, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357,358 ("[T]he non-refoulement principle, as evidenced 
by its incorporation in ... international instruments, may possess the force of a norm of customary 
international law [and] if so, all states are bound to observe it regardless of express agreement to do 
so."); Parker, supra note 18, at 679 ("The International Community has always recognized the right 
of civilians to flee flying bullets."); G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 97 ("There is substantial, if not 
conclusive, authority that the principle [of non-refoulement] is binding in all states, independently of 
specific intent."). See also R. PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 425-33 (1988) ("The congru-
ence of national law on the principle of non-refoulement, even in the case of states not parties to the 
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, is so striking that it appears to constitute a basis for recognizing 
that principle as one of general application. "). See infra Section lID. 
25 G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 69. Prior to the development of the non-refoulement principle, 
neighboring states would contract among themselves, establishing mutual obligations to surrender 
subversives, dissidents, and traitors to their countries of origin. Id. The "origins [of extradition] can 
be traced to ancient civilizations." S. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 16 
(1968). 
26 At this time in history, Europe and South America were experiencing political unrest resulting in 
the estrangement of their citizens. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 70. Persecution of Jews and 
Christians in Russia and the Ottoman Empire also led to the mass flight of refugees across national 
boundaries. Id. In response, sympathetic awareness was awakened in countries of refuge. /d. 
27 Aliens Act, 1905,5 Edw. 7, ch. 13, § 1(3). In pertinent part, article 1(3) of the Aliens Act states: 
[I]n the case of an immigrant who proves that he is seeking admission to this country solely 
/d. 
to avoid prosecution or punishment on religious or political grounds or for an offence of a 
political character, or persecution, involving danger of imprisonment or danger to life or 
limb, on account of religious belief, leave to land shall not be refused on the ground merely 
of want of means, or the probability of his becoming a charge on the rates .... 
1989] DEFENSES FOR THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT 229 
international instrument until some thirty years later, after the formation of the 
League of Nations. 28 
2. The League of Nations (1922-1946) 
The Charter of the League of Nations (League)"" was drafted by fourteen 
nations on April 28, 1919, and put into force on January II, 1920.:10 A reaction 
to World War I, the League was created to secure international peace by the 
"firm establishment of international law as the actual rule of conduct among 
Governments .... "31 As part of that responsibility, the League sought to insure 
fair treatment of those people made refugees as a result of armed conflict. 
The League's 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Ref-
ugees (Convention)32 was the first international agreement to refer explicitly to 
the principle of non-refoulernentY Article 3 of the Convention provides: 
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to remove or keep 
from its territory by application of police measures, such as expul-
sions or non-admittance at the frontier (refoulement), refugees who 
have been authorized to reside there regularly, unless the said mea-
sures are dictated by reasons of national security or public order. 34 
:!tl See infra note 3~ and accompanying text. 
:19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENA:-.JT 
311 LEAGUE OF I\:ATIONS 3 (I. Johnsen. ed. 1924) [hereinafter LEAGUE OF NATIONS]. President Woodrow 
vVilson advocated a League of Nations in his fatl10lls Fourteen Point Plan, and the United States 
became one of its original founders. fd. H at see inj,." note 31. 
31 LEAGUE OF :\I"ATIONS COVE~ANT. HljJra note 29, at Preamble. The Preatnble states: 
fd. 
In order to promote international cooperation and to secure international peace and security 
by the acreptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and 
honorable relations bet\\'een nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of 
international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance 
of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treatv obligations in the dealings of organized 
peoples with one another, the powers signatory to this covenant adopt this constitution of the 
League of Nations. 
Due to the tumultuous envirollrnent in which it was created, and the failure of its founders to reach 
a meaningful agreement regarding the structure and authority of the institution, the League was 
largely ineffectual. Smith, P'fjaCf to SCHWARZENHERGER, Tm: LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER 
at xi-xii (1936). President Wilson was not able to mnyince Congress to approve U.S. membership in 
the League. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 30, at 3. 
3' Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, Oct. 28, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 201. In 
1928. a group of states remmmended that Russian and Armenian refugees not be expelled from any 
member state when they ,,,,,ere not in a position to enter a neighboring country in a "regular manner." 
Arrangement Relating to the Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugees, June 30, 1928, art. 7. 
89 L.N.T.S. 55. This recommendation did not extend to those refugees who had intentionally entered 
the state in \'iolation of dotnestic la,,,,,. Id. 
:'\:) G. GOOD\\,IN-GILI., supra note 2, at 70. 
:H Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, .wpm note 32, at art. 3. The excep-
tions cOlltained in this pro\"ision are typical of those found in many of the non-refoulement provisions 
drafted thereafter. See, e.g., id.; Provisional Arrangemenl Concerning the Status of Refugees Conling 
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The Convention, by incorporation, defined a refugee as "[a]ny person ... who 
does not enjoy the protection of [his or her] government ... and who has not 
acquired another nationality."" Article 3 was not well received. Three of the 
eight participating states-Egypt, Italy, and Czechoslovakiac-expressed official 
reservations to the non-rejrJUlement provision.% 
Two later agreements seeking to protect refugees coming from Germany also 
refer to the principle of llon-refoulementY Once again, however, the signatories 
of these agreements expressed reservations to the principle.'" In both agree-
ments, for example, Great Britain excluded all refugees subject to extradition 
under existing treaties from the protection of the non-refoulemmt provisions.'" 
Only one of these agreements was ever ratified, and then, only by one of the 
participating states, thus emasculating the effectiveness of the llon-rejoulement 
provisions even among those states who signed the agreements without reser-
vation.") 
from Germany. July 4, 1936, art. 4(2). 171 L.I\'.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Provisional Arrangement Con-
cerning the Status of R~fugces]; Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Ger-
many. Fd). 10, 1983, art. 5(2). 192 L.N .T.S. 61 [hereinafter Convention Concerning the Status of 
Refugees]; 195,1 Convention, .I1lpm note 12, at art. 33(2); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, supra note 23, at art. 13; Declaration of Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), 22 U.N. 
CAOR Supp. (:-.10.16) at 757, LJ.N. Doc. A/6716, at art. 3(2) (1987). 
3; Arrangenlent Relating to the Iss\le ()f Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees, 
May 12, 1926, art. 2, 89 L.N.T.S. 48 [herein~fter Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity 
Certificates]. The Convention adopts this definition at article 1. Convention Relating to the Interna-
tional Status of Refugees, supra note 32, at art. 1 ("The present Coilvention is applicable to Russian, 
Armenian and assimilated refugees, as defined by the ArrangelTIent ... of May 12th, 1926 .... "). By 
the inclusion of the words "and assimilated refugees," the Convention defines refugee more broadly 
than t he Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates which includes only Russians and 
Armenians in its definition. Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates, supra. at art. 
2. 
'lI; Egypt reserved the right "to expel such refugees at any moment for reasons of public security." 
C()nvention Relating to the International Status of Retugees, supra note 32, at state signatnres. Italy 
likewise reserved the authority to expel refugees "for reasons of national seenrity and public order." 
[d. Czechoslovakia reserved the right to expel aliens who posed a danger to the safety of the state and 
public order as well as tllose subject to expulsion under existing extradition treaties. !d. 
37 SPe Provisional Arrangement Concerning the Status of Refugees, supra note 34, at art. 4(2) 
(,,[R]efugees ... may not be subjected by the authorities of that country to measures of expulsion or 
be sent back acro,s t\le frontier. . ."); Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees, supra note 34, 
at art. 5(2) ("[R]efpgecs may nO.t be snbjected I)y the authorities to measures of expulsion or 
reconduction .... "). 
'\K Provisional Arrangement Concerning the Status of Refugees, supra note 34 at, state signatures; 
Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees, supra note 34 at, state signatures. 
~\(I Provisional Aq-an.gcITIpH Concerning the Status of Refugees, supra note 34, at state signatures; 
Convention C~).ncerning the Status of Refugees, supra note 34, at state signatures. Further, the British 
included certain criminal and morally suspect refugees amo'.1g those excepted frOIll the article's 
protection. thus in,reasing the number of rehlgees subject to refoulement. Provisional Arrangenlent 
Conc~rning the Status of Refugees, supra note 34, at state signatures; Convention Coqcerning the 
Status of Refugees, ,\UjJra note 34, at state signatures. 
'" 3 P. Rom;, WORLD TREATY INDEX 302, 327 (2d ed. 1983). 
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As a result of such qualified acceptance of non-refoulement, the principle was 
slow to gain widespread formal recognition.!l The great increase in refugees 
during World War II, however, resulted in a limited practical compliance with 
non-refoulement by the Allied nations in Europe."" As large numbers of refugees 
poured into the countries of Western Europe, the sovereign nations there began 
to protect those fleeing political persecution."" While this change of attitude was 
neither extreme nor global, it did represent the first major step toward inter-
national acceptance of the principle of non-refoulement. 44 
C. Non-Refoulement in International Law After the Formation of the United 
Nations 
l. 1946-1951 
On February 12, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly, of which the 
United States remains a member, resolved to create a special committee to deal 
with the refugee problemY' Within this resolution, the General Assembly rec-
ommended that the proposed committee recognize the principle of non-refoule-
ment, thus expressing, for the first time, the United Nation's (U.N.) official 
acknowledgement of the principle. Hi This recommendation suggested that 
no refugees or displaced persons who have finally and definitely, in 
complete freedom, and after receiving full knowledge of the facts, 
including adequate information from the government of their coun-
tries of origin, expressed valid objections to returning to their coun-
41 G. GOODWIN-GILL, jupra note 2, at 71. 
" !d. 
4:; !d. Large numbers of refugees fleeing Russia, Spain, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire found 
refuge in neighboring countries. Id. For example, in 1939, France admitted feJUr hundred thousand 
Spanish refugees in just ten days. Id. at 71 n.12 (quoting 4 A. KISS, REPERTOIRE DE I.A PRATIQUE 
FRAN{:AlSE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAl. PUIl/.le 43~~-35 (1966)). 
44 Weis, The International Protection aIRefugees, 4H AM . .J. INT'L L. 193, 195-96 (1954). 
Id. 
Although it was not unknown fe)r refugees to he refused admittance to a country bordering 
on that from which they were escaping, such cases ,,,,ere rare and the general picture was one 
of persons at least being able to escape hom persecution. That was of course not the case as 
regards Jews during the \var; but after the war, when the movement of Spaniards continued 
and a movement from the counlries of Eastern Europe began, first asylum was not normally 
refused to persons who appeared to be bona fide refugees: nor were persons forcibly repa-
triated to those countries \vho had left them during the war. 
"Resolution, Adopted on the Repo,ts of the Third Committee, G.A. Res. 10, C.N. Doc. A/64, at 12 (1946) 
[hereinafter Resolutions]. The committee, created that same year, was the International Refugee 
Organization (lRO). See Refi'Kfel and Displaced Persons, G.A. Res. 62(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. I, at 97 
(l94H) . 
.t6 Resolutions, supra note 45, at l~. 
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tries of origin ... shall be compelled to return to their country of 
originY 
The principle was again recognized by the General Assembly, though indirectly, 
in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 48 Although the Declaration 
contained no provision expressly devoted to non-refoulement, article 3 Cthe right 
to life, liberty and security of the person"), article 13 ("the right to ... residence 
within the borders of a state ... [and] the right to leave any country"), article 
14 Cthe right to seek and to enjoy ... asylum from persecution"), and article 
IS ("the right to a nationality" and the freedom from denial of the right to 
change nationality), when viewed in concert clearly recognize the acceptance of 
the principle of non-refoulement.49 
Notwithstanding the existence of non-refoulement principles in international 
agreements, the practice of expelling refugees in the period following World 
War II was relatively widespread among individual states. 50 While a few of these 
refugees were expelled in accordance with certain war time extradition trea-
ties,'" many more refugees were subjected to forced repatriation than could be 
accounted for by these agreements. 52 
2. The United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees (19S1) 
The 19S1 U.N. Convention on the Status of the Refugee (19S1 Convention)53 
is the first international instrument to provide meaningful protection for the 
refugee by matching specific refugee rights with corresponding state obliga-
tions. 54 Like the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the 19S1 Convention seeks to guarantee the "fundamental rights and freedoms" 
of the refugee. 55 One of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 19S1 Con-
vention is the right of non-refoulement.56 
47 Id. The General Assembly did suggest a limitation to the scope of the non-refoulement provision, 
stating that "no action taken as a result of this resolution shall be of such a character as to interfere 
in any way with the surrender and punishment of war criminals, quislings and traitors, in conformity 
with present or future international arrangements or agreements . ... " Id. 
48 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 20. 
4"Id. at arts. 3, 13-15. 
50 G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 72. 
" The Russians and the Ukrainians were the primary subject of repatriation under these war time 
extradition treaties. Weis, supra note 44, at 196. 
"G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 72 n.15 and accompanying text. 
53 1951 Convention, supra note 12. 
34 Helton, supra note 2, at 504. See also Martin, supra note 24, at ~57-61. 
5.51951 Convention, supra note 12. at Preamble. 
',6Id. at art. 33(1). 
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Save those instances when the refugee falls under one of the enumerated 
exceptions in article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention, the language of article 33 
makes non-refoulement an absolute obligation upon the signing state:'" 
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee In 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion.S" 
The 1951 Convention defines a refugee as anyone who 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence ... IS 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 59 
Article 33 is the only article of substance which allows no reservations by a 
signing party.'i() The scope of article 33 expands the obligations of non-refoulement 
beyond the limits imposed by prior international agreements. til 
:,7 !d. The protections of article 33( I) are absolute in so far as the refugee's legal status in the country 
of refuge is immaterial. See //lJra note 61. The only exceptions are provided for in article 33(2): 
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there 
are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he 
is, or who, having been convicted by a hnal judgment of a particularly serious crime, consti-
tutes a danger to the community of that country. 
[d. at art. 33(2). Note how the article extends the national security exception to include those refugees 
convicted of serious crimes. The exceptions, however, though drafted in broad terms, were not meant 
to be applied mechanically, thereby defeating the purpose of article 33(1). G. GOODwIN-Gn.L, supra 
note 2, at 95-96. Indeed. a state may not expel a refugee under the color of one of the exceptions 
unless that refugee has been afforded due process of law. /d. ("The expulsion of such a refugee shall 
be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law."). The phrase 
"reasonable grounds" is not defined by the 1951 Convention, however, leaving a possible loophole for 
those member states desiring to escape the obligations of article 33. 
" 1951 Convention, supra note 12, at art. 33(1) (emphasis added). 
59/d. at art. 1(2). 
1i0 [d. at art. 42(1). See also Martin, supra note 24, at 361 (Article 33 is the only "major substantive 
article" in the 1951 Convention "to which no [reservations] are allowed."). 
iii Compare 1951 Convention, wpra note 12, at art. 33 with supra notes 27, 34, 37, 47 and accompanying 
text. Unlike prior agreements, article 33 prohibits direct as well as indirect expulsion. 1951 Convention, 
supra note 12, at art. 33. See also Goldman & Martin, supra note 16, at 313 ("[N]ot only maya state 
not directly expel a refugee to another country where he risks persecution, but similarly may not expel 
him to another country where there is a reasonable basis to believe that he would be returned 
subsequently to the country where he fears persecution."). 
Further, article 33 applies regardless of whether the alien is legally in the territory or not. 1951 
Convention, supra note 12, at art. 33. See also Goldman & Martin, supra note 16, at 313 ("Article 33, 
unlike other provisions in the Convention, makes no distinction between a refugee lawfully or unlaw-
fully in the state party's territory."). 
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As of 1983, forty-nine nations have ratified or acceded to the 1951 Conven-
tion.52 Many other nations, including the United States, which were not signa-
tories to the 1951 Convention, have ratified it indirectly through the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees6:l which incorporates the substantive 
provisions of the 1951 Convention.64 The 1951 Convention is perhaps the most 
significant international agreement which provides for non-refoulement. It is the 
foundation upon which a vast body of international refugee law has developed.65 
3. The U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) 
A major shortcoming of the 1951 Convention is its limited retrospective 
application. Article 1 extends the protections of the 1951 Convention to indi-
viduals who became refugees as a result of incidents occurring prior to January 
1, 1951.66 Thus, while the number of refugees increased with every new political 
upheaval, the corresponding number of those eligible for protection under the 
1951 Convention declined sharply.67 This problem was addressed sixteen years 
after the 1951 Convention was put into force. In the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (Protocol), the January 1, 1951 time limitation was 
e1iminatedYH 
The Protocol applies without geographic limitation save those expressly re-
served by the parties to the 1951 Convention.69 Except for the amended e1igi-
62 3 P. ROHN, supm note 40. at 635-36. The Conference of Plenipotentiaries to complete the drafting 
of the Convention was attended by 26 nations. including the United States. 1951 Convention, supra 
note 12. at state signatures. 
63 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Jan. 31. 1967. 19 U.S.T. 6260. T.I.A.S. No. 6577. 
606 L'.N .T.S. 268 [hereinafter Protocol of 1967]. 
As of 1983. twenty-seven states have ratified or acceded to the Convention indirectly by ratification 
or accession to the Protocol. 3 P. ROHN. supra note 40. at 1394-95. 
64 Article 1(1) of the Protocol states: "The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply 
articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention to refugees as hereinafter defined." Id. at art. 1(1). The 
definition of refugee referred to in article I( I) included a greater number of individuals than did its 
counterpart in article 1 of the 1951 Convention. /d. at art. 1(2). See generally infra notes 66-70 and 
accompanying text. 
65 G. GOODWIN-GILL. supra note 2. at 13. 
66 1951 Convention. supra note 12. at art. IA(2) ("As a result of events occurring before I January 
1951 .... "). 
67 "The States Parties to the present Protocol ... [realize] that new refugee situations have arisen 
since the Convention was adopted and that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the 
scope of the Convention .... " Protocol of 1967. supra note 63. at preamble. 
6. Article 1(2) of the Protocol of 1967 states: 
For the purposes of the present Protocol. the term "refugee" shall ... mean any person 
within the definition of article I of the Convention as if the words "As a result of events 
occurring before 1 January 1951 and ... " and the words" ... as a result of such events." in 
article IA(2) were omitted. 
Id. at art. 1(2). 
69 "The present Protocol shall be applied by the States Partie, hereto without any geographic 
limitation. save that existing declarations made by States already Parties to the Convention ... shall 
... apply also under the present Protocol." /d. at art. 1(3). 
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bility date, the definition of refugee found in the 1951 Convention is incorpo-
rated verbatim in the ProtocoP" Also, article 7(1) of the Protocol continues the 
prohibition against any reservations or qualified positions regarding article 33 
of the 1951 Convention.7! One commentator has stated that "[t]he presence of 
this limitation indicates that, sixteen years after the drafting of the 1951 Con-
vention, the principle of non-refoulement remained of such importance as to 
allow no conditional or alternative provisions. "72 As of 1983, sixty-one nations, 
including the United States, have ratified or acceded to the Protocol.73 
4. Other International Instruments Containing Non-Refoulement Provisions 
In addition to the 1951 Convention and the Protocol, there are a number of 
other important international instruments which contain provisions regarding 
non-refoulement. While the United States has not signed or ratified any of these 
agreements,74 their presence in the international community is not without legal 
significance. 75 
The 1966 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (International 
Covenant),76 though not mandating non-refoulement, does recognize the inter-
national rights of refugees facing expulsion. 77 The International Covenant's due 
process provision,78 coupled with its express recognition of "fundamental hu-
71l See supra note 6S. 
7! "At the time of accession. any State may make reservations in respect ... of any provisions of the 
Convention other than those contained in articles 1,3.4. 16(1) and 33 thereof .... " Protocol of 1967. 
supra note 63. at art. Vll( I) (empha~is added). See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
72 Martin. supra note 24. at 362. 
73 3 P. ROHN. supra note 40. at 1394-95. 
74 The United States has ratified very few international human rights agreements. Goldman & 
Martin. supra note 16. at 31S. "To date. the United States has ratified only the 1967 Protocol Relatihg 
to the Status of Refugees; the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery. the Slave 
Trade. and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; and the Slavery Convention of 1926. amended 
by the 1953 Protocol." Id. 
75 See infra Section lID. 
76 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. supra note 23. The Covenant recognizes that 
"the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want 
can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights 
.... " /d. at preamble. 
77 Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: "An alien lawfully in 
the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance 
of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall ... be allowed to submit the reasons against 
his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by ... competent authority .... " Id. at art. 13. Unlike the 
1951 Convention. the legal status of the refugee in the host state may jeopardize hi. or her standing 
under the provisions of this article. Compare id. with supra note 61. 
78 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. supra note 23. at art. 13. The Covenant 
assures due process to the refugee by allowing expUlsion "only in pursuance of a decision reached in 
accordance with law .... " Id. See also Martin. supra note 24. at 365. 
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man rights,"79 indicates a clear intent to restrict a state's· authority to expel 
refugees.8o 
The 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum of the U.N. General Assembly8I 
provides for non-refoulement in article 3(1): "No person [seeking asylum from 
persecution] shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier or, 
if he has already entered the territory in which he seeks asylum, expulsi<?n or 
compulsory return to any State where he may be subjected to persecution."82 
While this non-refoulement provision applies to refugees legally or illegally within 
the territory, exceptions are recognized when a vital concern exists for national 
security or domestic well-being.83 
Article 22 of the American Convention on Human Rights (American Con-
vention)84 provides an absolute right of non-refoulement: 
In no case mayan alien be deported or returned to a country, 
regardless of whether or not it is his country of origin, if in that 
country his right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being 
violated because of his race, nationality, religion, social status, or 
political opinions.85 
Unlike article 33 of the 1951 Convention, the American Convention recognizes 
no exceptions to article 22.86 As in earlier instruments, the protections of article 
22 extend to all persons within the borders of the state, whether they have 
crossed them legally or not.87 
The 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa promulgated by the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U. Conven-
79 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: 
There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights 
recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, 
regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such 
rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23, at art. 5(2). 
80 Martin, supra note 24, at 365. 
81 Declaration of Territorial Asylum, supra note 34. The provisions contained in the Declaration are 
not meant to "prejudice ... existing instruments dealing with asylum and the status of refugees ... " 
rather, they are to serve as a model whereupon states can "base ... their practices relating to territorial 
asylum .... " ld. at preamble. 
8' [d. at art. 3(1). 
83 "Exception may be made to the foregoing principle only for overriding reasons of national security 
or in order to safeguard the population, as in the case of a mass influx of persons." [d. at art. 3(2). 
84 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEAJser. L.lV.lII.60, doc. 28 rev. 1, at 31 (1983) [hereinafter American Conven-
tion]. The American Convention lists certain rights and obligations of men and women, including an 
extensive list of civil and political rights. [d. at arts. 3-25. 
85 [d. at art. 22(8) (emphasis added). 
86ld. 
87 "In no case mayan alien be deported .... " [d. (emphasis added). Thus. the refugee'S legal status 
appears to be irrelevant. See also, Goldman & Martin, supra note 16, at 314. 
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tion)88 contains the most comprehensive non-refoulement provIsIOn to date. 89 
Article IV of the a.A.V. Convention prohibits the denial of non-refoulement for 
discriminatory reasons. YO Additionally, article 1(2) of the a.A.V. Convention 
broadens the definition of refugee, extending the protections of non-refoulement 
to groups previously ineligible.9l 
D. Non-Refoulement and the International Norm 
The agreements mentioned above are a few of the many international instru-
ments which recognize the principle of non-refoulement.92 The number of such 
documents attests to the wide acceptance this principle has achieved in the 
international community. It also indicates that non-refoulement has become a 
recognized international legal norm.93 
International legal norms carry great weight. The International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) applies international legal norms as evidence of accepted law and 
8H O.A. U. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Sept. 10. 1969, 
IDOl U.N.T.S. 46 [hereinafter O.A.U. Convention]. The O.A.V. Convention espouses a practical 
approach to the refugee problem. While concerned with providing extensive protection for the bona 
fide refugee, the member states were also mindful of the national frictions caused by a joint refugee 
policy. as well as the inherent problems associated with assimilating potential political dissidents: 
We. the Heads of State and Government ... 
I. [Note] with concern the constantly increasing number of refugees in Africa and [desire] 
finding ways and means of alleviating their misery and suffering as well as providing 
them with a better life and future, 
2. [Recognize] the need for an essentially humanitarian approach towards solving the prob-
lems of refugees, 
3. [Realize,] however. that refugee problems are a source of friction among many Member 
States, and [desire] ... eliminating the source of such discord, 
4. [Desire] to make a distinction between a refugee who seeks a peaceful and normal life and 
a person fleeing his country for the sake of fomenting subversion from l the] outside. 
Id. at preamble. 
89 "No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, 
return or expulsion which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life. 
physical integrity or liberty would be threatened .... " Id. at art. II(3). 
90 Signatories agree to administer the provisions of the O.A. U. Convention without regard to race, 
religion. nationality, membership of a particular social group. or political views. Id. at art. IV. 
91 "The term 'Refugee' shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupa-
tion, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order ... is compelled to leave his place 
of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or 
nationality." /d. at art. 1(2). 
92 For an extensive list of documents \\'hich contain non-re{oulemfnt provisions, see Goldman & Martin, 
supra note 16, at 313-15. 
'," Hoffman, The Application of International Human Ri{{hts LaU' in State Courts: A View from California, 
18 INT'L LAW. 61, 61-67 (1984). International legal norms are also referred to as the customary 
international law (Martin, supra note 24, at 365; Parker, sut,ra note 18, at 677; G. GOODWtN-GILL. supra 
note 2, at 97), law of nations (Hassan, supra note 24, at 17). customary law (Goldman & Martin, .lUpra 
note 16, at 306). and international custom (see infra note 100). The author uses international legal 
nann merely for convenience. 
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principle among nations.9' Legal norms have been defined as principles which 
have gained the force of binding law on all nations through repeated and 
consistent use. 9S Evidence of an international norm may be found in "recitals 
in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same 
form, the practice of international organs ... re90lutions relating to legal ques-
tions in the United Nations General Assembly"96 and decisions of the ICj.97 
According to the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, if 
a principle of international law is recognized as a "customary rule," all members 
of the international community are bound by its obligations, notwithstanding 
express acknowledgement.9s 
The authority given legal norms is justified by an analogy to universal com-
mon iaw.99 That is, because the norm embodies a recognized human right 
94 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38 ("The [International] Court [of Justice] 
... 5,hall apply ... international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as laW [and] ... 
the general principles of law recognized by civilized natio!,s .... "). See also North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969I.C.j. 42 Gudgment of Feb. 20,1969) [hereinafter 
Continental Shelf Cases]. In the Continental Shelf Cases, the petitioner asserted th"t an article in an 
international agreement had become a customary international law. In response, the tntern'ltional 
Court of Justice stated: 
/d. 
In so far as thi~ contention is based on the view that [the Article] h'l5 had the influence, anel 
has produced the effect, described, it clearly involves treating that Article as a norm-creating 
provision whkh has constituted the foundation of, or has generated a rule which, while only 
conventional or contractional in its origin, has since passed into tho;! general corpus of inter-
national law, and is now accepted as such by the opinio juris, so as to become binding even for 
countries which have nev!'f, and do not, becolIle parties to the Convention [wherein the 
Article is contained.] Therf' is no doubt that this process is a perfectly possible one and does 
from time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by which rules 
of customary international law may be formed. 
95 "According to tr"ditional international law, a general practice is the result of the repetition of 
individual acts of States constituting consensus in regard to a certain content of a rule of law." South-
West African Cases (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.]. 248 Gudgment of July 18, 1966) 
(Tamak<!, j., dissenting) [hereinafter South-West African Cases]. See also Continental Shelf Cases, supra 
note 94, at 44 ("[T]he passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to 
the formation of a new rule of customary international law .... "). 
96 I. SROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (3d ed. 1979). See generally Helton, 
supra note 2, at 522 n.ll 5. 
97 Goldman & Martin, supra note 16, at 307 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 
10-11, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (footnotes omitted». See also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STAn:s § 103 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
98 RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, at § 102 comment i, § 324 comment e. See also South.West African 
Cases, supra note 95, at 289 ("Concerning the question whether the consent of all States is required 
for the creation of a customary international law or not, we consider that the answer must be in the 
negative .... "). See supra note 24. 
99 Hassan, supra note 24, at 20-21. In Fi/artiga v. Pena-lrala, Justice Kaufman states: 
United States courts are "bound by the law of nations, which is part of the law of the land." 
These words were echoed in The Paquete Habana ... : "[i]nternationallaw is part of our law, 
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts ... as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their deterlIlination." 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (1980) (footnotes omitted) (quoting The Paquete Habana, 
1989] DEFENSES FOR THE SANCTUARY MqVEMENT 239 
comwon to all, no state should be allowed to deny its consequential duty to 
honor that right. lOo Thus, as one commentator states, "[i]t is both reasonable 
and legitimate to expect that ... domestic law will accommodate international 
humanitarian norms."101 While other commentators continue to argue that the 
consent of individual states is not irrelevant,I02 non-refoulement is accepted as a 
binding principle of law by most states. 103 
III. THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT, NON-REFOULEMENT-BASED DEFENSES, AND 
THE U.S. COURTS 
A. The Sanctuary Movement 
The U.S. Sanctuary Movement originated in the early 1980s with a retired 
rancher from Tucson, Arizona named Jim Corbett. 104 Corbett became involved 
with the South American refugee situation after learning that a Salvadoran 
hitchhiker was forced from his friend's car at an INS checkpoint. 105 Concerned 
for the Salvadoran's well-being, Corbett discovered where the refugee was being 
held by the INS.106 Upon arrival at the INS holding center, Corbett saw des-
perate refugees living in over-crowded, unsanitary holding cells. t07 Shocked by 
these conditions, Corbett joined the Task Force on Central America of the 
Tucson Ecumenical Council, an activist group which posted bond for refugees 
detained in INS holding centers. lOB Corbett allowed many of these bonded 
refllgees to stay in his hume until their asylum applications were processed by 
the INS.IOg The Tucson Ecumenical Council freed over one hundred refugees 
from INS detention. 110 Despite its success, the Council abandon~d the legal 
route when it became clear that more drastic measures were required to meet 
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). See also Hoffman, supra note 63, at 67 ("Customary international law has 
been held to be part of our common law and is similarly regarded by courts in most nations that have 
a common law tradition."); RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, at § III comment d. 
100 "[I]nternational custom ... indicates that nations have accepted as law an obligation to observe 
fundamental human rights." Goldman & Martin, supra note 16, at 306 (quoting Brief for Uni\ed States 
as Amicus Curiae at 9, Filartiga v. Pen<\-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980». 
101 Helton, supra note 2, at 522. 
102 "[W]e still have not reached the stage in the formation and evolution of international legal norms 
wherein the consent of the state becomes irrelevant." Hassan, supra note 24, at 29. 
10' See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
104 SANCTUARY: A RESOURCE GUIDE 18-19 (G. MacEain ed. 1985); R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNEJ..L, 
supra note 4, at 39-40. 
1051d. at 39; SANCTUARY: A RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 104, at 18. 
106Id.; R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 39-40. 
107/d. at 39. 
108 SANCTUARY: A RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 104, at 18-19; R. GOLDEN & M. l\IlCCONNELL, supra 
note 4, at 40. 
109 SANCTUARY: A RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 104, at 18-19; R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNEL\., supra 
note 4, at 40. 
1I0/d. 
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the needs of the Central American refugee. I I I By attempting to house both 
bonded and illegal aliens, Corbett's undertaking became unmanageable, and he 
turned to his friend, John Fife, for help.1I2 Fife, the pastor of Southside Pres-
byterian Church in Tucson, Arizona, presented the situation to his congrega-
tion. After an affirmative secret vote, Fife publicly declared his church the first 
sanctuary for Central American refugees. 1I3 
From these humble beginnings, the Sanctuary Movement has grown rapidly, 
with membership estimated at over three hundred church and humanitarian 
support groups throughout the United States."4 These groups offer food, 
shelter, and legal assistance to Salvadorans and Guatamalans who have fled to 
the United States in order to escape persecution and death."5 While the Sanc-
tuary Movement was originally centered in California and Southwestern 
Texas,"6 it has grown considerably, and sanctuary groups can be found in cities 
throughout the United States, including Tucson, Arizona; Seattle, Washington; 
III /d. at 46-47; SANCTUARY: A RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 104, at 19. 
1121d. 
1131d. at 19-22; R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 46. While the Catholic Church has 
become the spearhead of the Movement, other congregations such as the Quakers, Presbyterians, 
Unitarians, and Jews have joined the effort. The Washington Post, March 25, 1985, at Bl, col. 4; L.A. 
Daily.J., Jan. 29, 1985, at 4, col. 3. 
The sanctuary tradition dates back to the ancient Egyptians, Greeks, and Israelites. R. GOLDEN & 
M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 15; The Boston Globe, Jan. 27, 1985, at 18, col. I. See also Comment, 
Sanctuary: The Legal Institution in England, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 677 (1987). While the United 
States has never officially recognized the right of sanctuary, humanitarian and church groups have 
offered sanctuary to runaway slaves in the mid-19th century, and to conscientious objectors and AWOL 
soldiers during the Vietnam conflict. Id. For a brief discussion of sanctuary in the United States, see 
Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury-A Government's Weapon Against the Sanctuary Movement, 
15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5,40-43 (1986); Helton, supra note 2, at .'i50-53. 
114 Colbert, supra note 113, at 24 n.106; Helton, supra note 2, at 493. See also R. GOLDEN & M. 
MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 52-54 (the authors estimate the number of sanctuary groups to be as 
high as three thousand). 
115 R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 14; Helton, supra note 2, at 493,503. Current civil 
unrest in EI Salvador began in 1977 when General Carlos Humberto Romero usurped the presidency 
through a sham election. Fisher, Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 
I, I (1982). Thereafter, Romero began a reign of terror marked by torture, rape, and murder. The 
violence in EI Salvador captured world attention in 1980 when Archbishop Oscar Romero was assas-
sinated while performing Mass, and four Maryknoll missionaries were raped and murdered by Sal-
vadoran National Guardsmen. Colbert, supra note 113, at 31. 
Reports of human rights violations in Guatamala are no less disturbing. According to the Organi-
zation of American States' human rights report, violence practiced by the Guatamalan Government 
"has shown characteristics of brutality and barbarism by the massive assassinations of peasants and 
indians with guns, machetes or knives; the bombing and machine-gunning of villages by land and air; 
the burning of houses, churches and communal houses as well as crops." ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN 
STATES, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF GUATAMALA 61 (1983). 
For a concise history of the violence and civil unrest in EI Salvador and Guatamala see generally 
Colbert, supra note 113, at 25-31. 
116 Comment, Sanctuary: Reconciling Immigration Policy with Humanitarianism and the First Amendment, 
18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 137, 139 (1986). 
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Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Chicago, Illinois; and Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts.1I7 
When the movement was in its infant stages, the INS did not consider it "a 
serious threat to enforcement efforts"118 and allowed the sanctuary groups to 
conduct their operations with little interference. 119 According to Bill Joyce, INS 
Assistant General Counsel, "[w]e're not about to send investigators into a church 
to start dragging people out in front of the television cameras. We just wait 
them out .... This is a political thing dreamed up by the churches to get 
publicity. If we thought it was a significant problem, then maybe we'd look at 
it."120 The situation changed drastically between 1981 and 1984 when sanctuary 
groups became the focus of INS investigations and prosecutionsl21 under 8 
U.S.C. § 1324, which prohibits the bringing in, transporting, or harboring of 
illegal aliens. 122 Moved by political conviction and moral obligation,123 sanctuary 
workers continue to defy the INS by offering support to fleeing refugees. 124 
Their battle has now moved to the courts, where sanctuary workers are 
asserting that Salvadorans and Guatamalans have a right of refuge guaranteed 
by both domestic and international law. 125 This fact, they claim, insulates the 
sanctuary workers against the government's § 1324 prosecutions.126 To this day, 
the courts remain unconvinced. 127 
117 Comment, United States Political Asylum for Salvadoran Refugees: A Continuing Debate, 8 Hous. J. 
INT'L L. 131, 134 n.24 and accompanying text (1985); The Boston Globe, Jan. 27,1985, at 18, col. I. 
118 Colbert, supra note 113, at 43 (quoting Dean B. Thatcher, INS Intelligence Agent). 
119Id. at 43. 
120 R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 4, at 71 (quoting Bill Joyce, INS Assistant General 
Counsel). 
121 The author is not clear, from a review of sources, why the government moved away from their 
"hands off" position regarding the Sanctuary Movement. However, there is little doubt that a "con-
scious government decision" was made to pursue the illegal activities of the Sanctuary Movement. 
Helton, supra note 2, at 554; see also Colbert, supra note 113, at 44; SANCTUARY: A RESOURCE GUIDE, 
supra note 104, at 23 ("Actually, as is now known, the INS and the administration were deeply worried" 
despite their "professed ... [unconcern for] what they described as an insignificant sideshow .... "). 
122 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982). 
123 Many sanctuary workers believe they have an obligation to help these refugees in lieu of U.S. 
involvement in the affairs of El Salvador. Note, United States Political Asylum for Salvadoran Refugees: A 
Continuing Debate, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 131, 134 (1985). See also Helton, supra note 2, at 503. 
124 Colbert, supra note 113, at 47. Commenting on the Government's crack down on the Sanctuary 
Movement, Rev. William Sloane Coffin, Jr., pastor of Riverside Church in New York, remarked: 
"There's only two things in life that increase in value when they're stepped on: Persian rugs and the 
church." The Boston Globe, Jan. 27, 1985, at I, col. I. 
125 See infra Section IIIC. 
126Id. 
127 Now that the Sanctuary Movement is the subject of INS prosecutions, humanitarian organizations 
are hesitant to join the Movement. Undercover investigations have roused mistrust among members 
of sanctuary church congregations. Those who continue to support the Movement are faced with 
strong opposition from less convicted parishioners who fear for the survival of their church. See, e.g., 
Helton, supra note 2, at 558-59. It is clear that the Sanctuary Movement cannot continue as a movement 
of consequence if the courts continue to hand down convictions. 
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B. Non-Refoulement and U.S. Law 
In order to thwart governm~nt prosecutions, sanctuary workers have devised 
affirmative defenses based on rwn-refoulement.128 They argue that non-refoulement 
gives refugees the absolute right not to be returned to a territory where they 
fear political, social, or religious persecution. 129 Thus, aliens who qualify for 
refugee status have the right of temporary refuge within the host state until 
another country is willing to accept them or until they are granted asylum. 130 
If refugees have a right of temporary refuge guaranteed by non-refoulement, 
then they are not illegally within the country, and thus, the sanctuary workers 
assert that they are immune from § 1324 convictions. 131 
If this argument solely depended upon international law, sanctuary workers 
could not look forward to much success in light of the Reagan Administration's 
inconsistent commitment to its international obligations. 132 With the U.S. acces-
sion to the Protocol of 1967 and the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, 
however, sanctuary workers believe they can find support for their defenses 
within domestic law. 133 
1. Early History 
The equivalent to non-refoulement in U.S. law is § 243(h) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA), the withholding of deportation provision. 134 The 




132 See, e.g., Gardner, U.S. Termination of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 
24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421 (1986); Leigh, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nica-
ragua, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 442 (1985); N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1985, at 27, col. 2. 
133 See, e.g., infra notes 218, 229, 241, 245 and accompanying text. See generally infra notes 148-66 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the U.S. accession to the Protocol; see generally infra notes 
167-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. 
134 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163,214 (1952) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)) [hereinafter INA]. 
For a brief description of the deportation process in the United States, see Martin, supra note 24, 
at 366-67: 
In United States law, deportation is an administrative process under the jurisdiction of the 
Attorney General .... The Attorney General or his delegate determines whether to initiate 
deportation proceedings. These begin with notice to the refugee, ordering him to show cause 
why he .hould not be deported. A hearing, before an INS immigration judge, determines 
this question. The refugee is entitled to representation by council, to present evidence and 
argument in his behalf, and to cross-examine government witnesses. , . , Deportation orders 
are appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals. After exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, the refugee may seek judicial review by petitioning a federal district court for a 
writ of habeas corpus. 
At the deportation hearing the refugee may plead anticipated persecution in order to 
contest deportation. The imwigration judge usually requests an advisory opinion from the 
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withholding of deportation provision gives the Attorney General'35 discretionary 
power to temporarily withhold the deportation of a refugee if he believes the 
refugee has made the necessary demonstration of persecution required under 
the INA.136 With few exceptions, the Attorney General's determinations are 
above judicial review. 137 
The withholding of deportation provision ~as first incorporated 1Pto U.S. law 
in 1950, when the Immigration Act of 1917 138 was amended by 'the Internal 
Security Act (lSA)Yl9 The ISA contained a provision that required the Attorney 
General to withhold the deportation of a refugee to any country wl)ere the 
refugee could show a fear of physical persecution; 140 The provision was repeatecj 
in the INA, however, the language of the withholding provision was changed, 
making deportation a discretionary decision of the Attorney General. 141 The 
Attorney General would withhold an alien's deportation only when he was 
convinced there existed a "clear probability of [physical] per~ecutioTl."142 The 
Attorney General was reluctant to make this determination, and the courts 
refused to upset his rulings unless he had clearly abused his administrative 
discretion. 143 
Id. 
Department of State concerning the likelihood of persecution. Though not binding, such an 
opinion may well be accorded substantial weight due to its source. 
135 The Attorney General exercises his authority through the INS. 8 C.F.R. § 100.2 (1988). "The 
Attorney General has delegated to the Commissioner, the princip~e officer of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, authority to administer and enforce the Immigration and Nationality Act and 
all other laws relating to immigration, naturalization and nationality .... " /d. See also 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 
(1988) (further delegation of the powers of the Attorney General). 
13fi See infra notes 141, 147 and accompanying text. From 1950 through 1965, the required showing 
was "physical persecution." This standard was relaxed in 1965, requiring only "persecution on account 
of race, religion or political opinion." See infra notes 140-41, 145-47 and accompanying text. 
137 Helton, supra note 3, at 244-45. 
138 Immigration Act of Feb. 5,1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917). 
139 Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (1952) [hereinafter ISA]. See Note, The 
Endless Debate: Refugee Law and Policy and the 1980 Refugee Aer, 32 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 117, 138 (1983-
1984). 
140 "No alien shall be deported under any provisions of this Act to any country in which the Attorney 
General shall find that such alien would be subjected to physical persecution." ISA; supra note 139, at 
ch. 1024, § 23,64 Stat. at JOJO. 
141 "The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States 
to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution . ... " INA, supra 
note 134, at § 243(h), 66 Stat. at 214 (emphasis added). 
142 Lena v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967). The Attorney 
General was not easily persuaded. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 474-
76 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (recounts 
numerous episodes where the INS found no evidence of a well founded fear of persecution and 
deported refugees to Haiti despite overwhelming evidence that the refugees' families had been killed 
by the Haitian government, and the refugees themselves were considered opponents and traitors to 
the regime). 
143 Helton, supra note 3, at 244-45 ("The standard of [the court's] review was quite deferential."). 
See, e.g., Lena, 379 F.2d at 537 ("This Court may determine whether there has been an abuse of the 
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The INA was amended in 1965.144 The need to show "physical persecution" 
was relaxed, in favor of a new standard requiring the refugee to show "perse-
cution on account of race, religion, or political opinion."145 Thus, the Attorney 
General was authorized to withhold the deportation of any alien who had been 
persecuted for any of the specified reasons, whether or not this persecution 
resulted in physical abuse. 146 The 1965 amendments did not, however, alter the 
discretionary authority of the Attorney General to determine who qualified for 
the withholding of deportation. 147 
2. The U.S. Accession to the 1967 U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees 
In 1968, the International Year of Human Rights,148 the U.S. government 
ratified the U.N. Protocol of 1967. 149 The Protocol, as interpreted in interna-
tional law,150 is more sympathetic to the plight of the refugee than the 1965 
amendments to the INA which require a refugee to show a "clear probability" 
of persecution in order to have his or her deportation withheld. 151 The Protocol 
prohibits refoulement of a refugee who meets the more lenient standard of "well-
founded fear of persecution."152 Additionally, the Protocol provides a broader 
discretion reposed in the Attorney General but we do not substitute our own opinion for his so long 
as his reasons for denying suspension of deportation in any case are sufficient on their face."). 
144 Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,79 Stat. 91 I (\965) 
[hereinafter INA Amendments of 1965]. 
1" "Section 243(h) [of the INS] is amended by striking out 'physical persecution' and inserting in 
lieu thereof 'persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion.'" [d. at § II(f), 79 Stat. at 
918. 
At least until 1968, the courts interpreted this amended language as requiring the refugee "to 
demonstrate a 'clear probability of persecution' or a 'likelihood of persecution' in order to be eligible 
for withholding of deportation." Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 414-
15 (1984). 
1'6 See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text. 
147 IN A Amendments of 1965, supra note 144, at § 11 (f), 79 Stat. at 918. See supra note 141. 
1'" 114 CONGo REC. 27757 (1968). 
1," Ser supra note 73 and accompanying text. The Protocol was ratified by the Congress of the United 
States on Oct. 4, 1968. 114 CONGo REC. 29608 (1968). 
150 See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra note 145. 
152 1951 Convention, supra note 12, at art. 1A(2) (as incorporated in the Protocol of 1967, supra note 
63, at arts. 1(1)-(3». 
!d. 
For the purposes of the present convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any person 
who ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion ... is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of [his or her] country ... or who ... is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
Initially it was unclear whether a well-founded fear of persecution was an easier standard than the 
clear probability of persecution standard. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Service V. Cardoza-
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definition of "persecution,"153 contains no ideological or geographical limita-
tions,I54 and limits the scope of discretion permitting a state to expel refugees. 155 
Under the provisions of the Protocol, the state can only deport a refugee when 
the individual poses a threat to national security or has been convicted of a 
serious crime, thus representing a danger to the community.I56 
While the language of the Protocol of 1967 appears more permissive than 
the withholding of deportation provision of the 1965 amendments to the INA, 
accession to the Protocol has been viewed as merely symbolic, leaving the im-
migration laws of the United States unaltered. 157 The history of the U.S. acces-
sion to the Protocol, however, does not necessarily support this conclusion. 
According to Secretary of State Dean Rusk's submittal letter to the President, 
"United States accession to the Protocol would not impinge adversely upon the 
laws of this country."158 This was not to say that accession to the Protocol would 
have no effect on U.S. immigration law whatsoever. In his testimony before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Laurence A. Dawson, Acting Deputy Di-
Fonseca, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1208-09 (1987). The matter was finally decided in Immigration and Natural-
ization SenJice v. Cardoza-Fonseca: 
We do not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the well-founded fear test should 
be applied. Instead, we merely hold that the Immigration Judge and the BIA [Board of 
Immigration Appeals] were incorrect in holding that [the well-founded fear and the clear 
probability] standards are identical. 
[T]o show a "well-founded fear of persecution," an alien need not prove that it is more 
likely than not that he or she will be persecuted by his or her ;lOme country. 
Id. at 1222. 
l5:I Inclusive of the 1965 amendments, the INA did not contain a definition of the word "persecu-
tion." INA, supra note 134; INA Amendments of 1965, supra note 144. However, according to the 
court in Kovac v. INS, "there is nothing to indicate that Congress intended section 243(h) to encompass 
any more than the word 'persecution' ordinarily conveys-the infliction of suffering or harm upon 
those who differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive." 407 F.2d 102, 
107 (1969). 
The Protocol, on the other hand, defines persecution as "[the threat] to life or freedom ... on 
account of ... nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." 1951 Con-
vention, supra note 12, at art. 33( I) (as incorporated in the Protocol of 1967, supra note 63, at arts. 
1(1 )-(3». A showing of a threat to life or freedom seems more easily established than offensive 
suffering. Note, The Refugee Act of J980-What Burden of Proof" Controversy Lives on After Stevie, 18 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 875, 882 nAO (1985). 
154Id. at 882. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
I;; Section 243(h) of the INA gives the Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any 
alien who he believes would be subject to persecution under the provisions of the 1965 amendments. 
INA, supra note 134, at § 243(h). In contrast, the Protocol prohibits the refoulement of any alien who 
qualifies as a refugee under the provisions of article I of the 1951 Convention. See 1951 Convention, 
supra note 12, at art. 33(1) (as incorporated in the Protocol of 1967, supm note 63, at arts. 1(1)-(3». 
156 1951 Convention, supra note 12, at art. 33(2) (as incorporated in the Protocol of 1967, supra note 
63, at arts. I( 1)-(3». 
157 See Note, supra note 153, at 882. Indeed, the House report on the Refugee Act of 1980 did not 
even mention the accession to the Protocol in its detailed history of the evolution of U.S. refugee law. 
H.R. REP. No. 96-608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1979). 
15" 114 CONGo REC. 27758 (1968) (emphasis added) (submittal letter from Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk to President Lyndon B. Johnson). 
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rector of the Office of Refugee and Migrations Affairs, stated that "accession 
[to the Protocol] does not ... commit the contracting state to enlarge its im-
migration measures for refugees .... The deportation provisions of the [INA] 
. . . are consistent with this cohcept. The Attorney General will be able to 
administer such provisions in conformity with the Protocol without amendment 
of the Act."!59 Thus, while amendment to U.S. immigration law was considered 
unnecessary, acting in conformity with the Protocol within the existing legal 
structure was contemplated. This view is supported by the testimony of Eleanor 
McDowell, Office of Legal Advisor, Department of State.!60 After noting a 
possible conflict between article 32 of the Protocol and two deportation proce-
dures allowed under the current U.S. law, McDowell stated that "[t]hese two 
areas would not be enforced against refugees if the protocol [sic] were in 
force."!6! Although accession to the Protocol did not necessitate any formal 
amendment to U.S. immigration law, it is clear that accession did anticipate a 
change in the enforcement of the existing law. 
The fine distinction between the Protocol's effect on U.S. law, versus its effect 
on the enforcement of the law, was not preserved with any consistency during 
the Senate hearings. In his closing remarks, Acting Deputy Director Dawson 
appeared to contradict his earlier testimony by suggesting that accession to the 
Protocol was merely symbolic in light of the fact ~hat the "United States already 
meets the standards of the Protocol .... "!62 President Lyndon B. Johnson 
appeared to echo this sentiment in his letter to Congress presenting the Protocol 
for ratification: "United States accession to the Protocol would ... constitute a 
significant and symbolic element in our ceaseless effort to promote everywhere 
the freedom and dignity of the individual and of nations .... "!63 
Few courts were willing to view the U.S. accession to the Protocol as anything 
more than a meaningless gesture of good will.!64 Those courts which were willing 
to subject the Attorney General's decisions to a more exacting judicial review 
refused to articulate any official recognition of a limitation on his discretionary 
authority.!6; Most courts simply refused to recognize the creation of any hew 
rights for refugees as a result of U.S. accession to the Protocol.!66 
159 Td. at 27844 (statement of Laurence A. Dawson). 
Ifill S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1968) (statement of Eleanor McDowell). 
IfilTrl. 
162 114 CONGo REC. 27844 (1968) (statement of Laurence A. Dawson). 
163 Irl. at 27758 (letter from Lyndon B. Johnson to Congress). 
164 Martin, supra note 24, at 371-73. 
165 See, e.g., Coriolan V. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977). The 
court remanded for reconsideration a Haitian refugee's claim of political persecution after determining 
that an INS immigration judge had made errors of fact and law. Td. at 998-\002, 1004. However, the 
court declined to decide "whether the Protocol restricts the Attorney General's discretion to refuse to 
stay deportation when he has determined that an alien would face persecution if deported." Td. at 
997. 
16b Martin, supra note 24, at 373. 
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3. The Refugee Act of 1980 
After twelve years of U.S. lip service to the Protocol,167 Congress passed the 
Refugee Act of 1980168 in an attempt to bring U.S. law into conformity with 
the international obligations of the United States. Senator Edward Kennedy, 
the original sponsor of the Refugee Act, noted: "[This Act] will rationalize and 
put in the statute how we treat all refugees, and make our law conform to the 
United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
which we signed in 1969."169 
Significant portions of the Refugee Act are borrowed from the Protocol. First, 
the Refugee Act Introduces a definition of "refugee" into U.S. law using lan-
guage essentially similar to articie I (2) of the 1951 Convention as incorporated 
in the Protocol: 
The term "refugee" means ... any person who is outside any coun-
try of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having 
no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last 
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and 
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection 
of, that country because of ... a well-founded fear of persecution 
on accbunt of race, religion, nationality, membership ih a particular 
social group, or political opinion .... I70 
Furthermore, the Refugee Act amends the withholding of deportatioh provi-
sion, modelihg it after the non-refoulernent provision contained in the Prbtocol. l7I 
167 Helton, supra note 3, at 247. U.S. disrespect for the Protocol was brought to national attention 
in 1970 when a Lithuanian sailor aboard a Soviet vessel jumped ship and swam to a u.s. Coast Guard 
vessel, seeking asylum. O'Brien, The Kudirka Affair-Bnnging Sanity to the Laws of Asylum, 8 HUM. RTs. 
38, 39 (1980). Even though both the U.S. and the Soviet vessels were in U.S. waters at the time of the 
incident, the INS would not investigate the Lithuanian's application for asylum, and refused to grant 
him temporary refuge because he was not technically in the United States. Id. at 39-40; Note, supra 
note 153, at 884-85. Five Soviet sailors were allowed to board the Coast Guard vessel where they beat 
the Lithuanian sailor and then forced him to return to their ship. O'Brien, supra, at 50. This so called 
Kudirka Affair proved highly embarrassing to the U.S. government and served as a major impetus to 
the coming changes in U.S. immigration law. Note, supra note 153, at 884-86. See also Helton, supra 
note 3, at 249. 
16R Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in 8 U.S.c. §§ 1101-254) 
[hereinafter Refugee Act]. 
169 The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 643 Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1-2 (1979) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 643]. See also The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 
2816 Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the flouse Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1979) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2816] (statement of Hon. Eliz. 
Holtzman, Subcommittee Chairwoman) ("There is a broad consensus that our refugee policy up to 
this time has been haphazard and inadequate."); Hearings on S. 643, supra, at 9 (statement of Hon. 
Dick Clark, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs) ("[W]e have carried out oVr refugee programs 
through what is essentially a patchwork of different programs that evolved in response to specific 
crises. The resulting legislative framework is inadequate .... "). 
170 Refugee Act, supra note 168, at § 201(a), 94 Stat. at 102. See supra text accompanying notes 59, 
70. 
171 'The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney 
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The Refugee Act's version of § 243(h) is significantly different from the 
corresponding provision in the 1965 amendments to the INA in two respects. 
First, it recognizes more forms of persecution than the 1965 amendments. Prior 
to 1980, § 243(h) recognized persecution based on "race, religion, [and] political 
opinion" only."~ The Refugee Act acknowledges persecution "on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion."I7:] Thus, two additional grounds for persecution, nationality and mem-
bership in a particular social group, are included in the amended § 243(h). 
The second, and more important, change is the limitation on the Attorney 
General's discretionary authority to deport refugees. 174 The 1965 amendments 
provided the Attorney General with broad authority to withhold the deportation 
of a refugee who would face persecution upon return. 175 The Refugee Act, 
however, requires the Attorney General to withhold deportation when such fear 
of persecution exists: "The Attorney General shall not deport or return any 
alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life 
or freedom would be threatened in such country .... "176 
With the passage of the Refugee Act, the Attorney General's discretion re-
garding the deportation of refugees rests solely on his authority to decide 
whether the conditions in a refugee's country of origin would prevent depor-
tation. 177 In the case of the Central American refugee, the Attorney General 
has regularly determined that existing conditions do not warrant withholding 
of deportation. 17H As noted above, however, the U.S. accession to the Protocol 
did alter at least one court's attitude towards judicial review of the Attorney 
General's findings. 17H Reaffirmed by the passage of the Refugee Act, with its 
General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Refugee 
Act, supra note 168, at § 203(h), 94 Stat. at 107. Compare id. with 1951 Convention, supra note 12, at 
art. 33 (as incorporated in the Protocol of 1967, supra note 63, at arts. 1(1)-(3)). See also H.R. REP. No. 
96-781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 160, 161 ("The 
Conference substitute adopts the House [deportation] provision with the understanding that it is based 
directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consistent 
with the Protocol."). 
,;, See supra note 145. 
175 See supra note 171. 
'74 Sa inFra notes 175-76 and accompanying text. According to Griffin B. Bell, then Attorney 
General of the United States, "[m]y complaint all along has been that like foreign policy, [refugee 
policy] should not be vested in the Attorney General, but in the President and the Secret"ry of State." 
Hearings on H.R. 2816, supra note 169, at 26. 
m See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
176 Refugee Act, supra note 168, at § 203(ofi), 94 Stat. at 107 (emphasis added). 
177 1r!. "Thus, while the Attorney General has lost the discretion to decide whether to deport, he is 
still vested with the sole authority to decide when conditions are such as to allow deportation." Martin, 
IUpm note 24, at 371. 
,7< R. GOl.DEN & M. MCCONNELl., supra note 4, at 42-43. 
179 Sre supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. 
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clear intent to bring U.S. law into closer conformity with international law, other 
courts have utilized their power of review more freely and critically to curb any 
abuse of discretion by the Attorney GeneraLIHO 
C. Non-Refoulement and Defenses to 8 U.S.c. § 1324(a) 
I. Section 1324(a) 
Sanctuary workers are being prosecuted under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a),181 which 
prohibits the bringing in, transporting, or harboring of illegal aliens. Section 
1324(a) is a criminal statute and carries a possible fine not to exceed two 
thousand dollars or a prison term not to exceed five years or both. 182 It is well 
established that a § 1324(a) conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt lS3 that the defendant knew he or she was aiding an alien who was not 
entitled to be in the United States. 184 This element of "actual knowledge" is 
included in this section to insure that those who innocently and unknowingly 
aid illegal aliens will not face criminal prosecution.ls5 
180 Martin, supra note 24, at 371. Accordingly, the courts now consider the Attorney General's 
determination of the probability that a refugee would not face persecution if deported an appropriate 
subject of judicial review. Id. See generally id. at 373-77. 
Id. 
ISI8 U.s.c. § 1324(a), in relevant part, states: 
Any person ... who-
(I) brings into or lands in the United States, by any means of transportation or 
otherwise, or attempts, by himself or through another, to bring into or land in the 
United States, by any means of transportation or otherwise; 
(2) knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law, and knowing or having 
reasonable grounds to believe that his last entry into the United States occurred less 
than three years prior thereto, transports, or moves, or attempts to transport or 
move, within the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in further-
ance of such violation of law; 
(3) willfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts 
to conceal, house, or shield from detection in any place, including any building or 
any means of transportation; or 
(4) willfully and knowingly encourages or induces, or attempts to encourage or 
induce, either directly or indirectly, the entry into the United States of-
any alien ... not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or 
reside within the United States under the terms of this chapter or any other law relating to 
the immigration or expulsion of aliens, shall be guilty of a felony. 
182 !d. 
183 Because § 1324(a) is criminal in nature, it must be strictly construed and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. U.S. v. Shaddix, 693 F.2d 1135, 1139 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting U.S. v. Moreno, 561 
F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1977)). See generally 30 AM . .lUR. 20 Evidence § § 1170-72 (1967). 
184 Even though the "actual knowledge" requirement is not stated in § I 324(a)(I ), it has long been 
accepted that "[klnowledge of the aliens' illegal status (their lack of entitlement to reside) is an essential 
element of the crime proscribed by § 1324(a)(I)." U.S. v. Bunker, 523 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 1976). 
The language of the remaining three subsections expressly require actual knowledge (See § 1324(a)(2): 
"knowing;" § 1324(a)(3): "willfully and knowingly;" § 1324(a)(4): "willfully and knowingly"). See supra 
note 181. 
185 Senator Celler, the chief supporter of the 1952 version of § 1324 assured Congress that the 
purpose of § 1324 was not to ensnare unsuspecting humanitarians in criminal convictions. 
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Relying on non-refoulernent, the sanctuary workers have challenged their 
§ 1324(a) prosecutions on two grounds. First, the workers argue that their good 
faith belief that the domestic and international principle of non-refoulernent 
entitles a refugee to enter the United States demonstrates their lack of intent 
to violate § 1324(a), thereby defeating the government's charges. ls6 In the al-
ternativ~, the workers argue that their belief regarding the refugee's entitlement 
to enter the Upited States is correct, and therefore, they assert that their actions 
violate no law because the refugees whom they assist are legally within the 
coun try. 187 
2. Actual Knowledge and Intent-The "Ignorance of Law" Defense 
The sanctuary workers indicted under § 1324(a) have sought to demonstrate 
their good faith belief that the aliens assisted were refugees, and thus, entitled 
to enter the United States under § 243(h) of the Refugee Act and the interna-
tional principle of non-refoulernimt. 188 they argue that the defendant who rea-
sonably believes, however mistakenly, that a refugee is entitled to enter the 
United States cannot possess the requisite intent to violate § 1324(a) by know-
ingly and willfully bringing in, transporting, or harboring illegal aliens. ls9 
The government has responded to this defense by asserting that "ignorance 
of the law is no defense."19o However, the "ignorance of the law" tenet no longer 
plays as vital a role in U.S. criminal jurisprudence as it once had. It is now 
modified and limited by both constitutional and statutory law. 19l The modern 
I do not wish to center an attack on anybody except the smuggler and the man who tries to 
make money out of the misery of some of these workers. That is what I want to get after. 
Certainly we do not want to get after the good people. It is the bad at whom we aim our 
shafts. 
98 CONGo REc. 1347 (1952). 
Ironically, the district court in U.S. v. Maria Del Socorro Pardo de Aguilar acknowledged that the 
defendants had been motivated by "humanitarian concerns as well as a desire to rectify unfair appli-
cation of immigration laws," i.e. "good people." Defendants' Appellate Brief at 43, U.S. V. Maria del 
Socorro Pardo de Augilar, CR 85-008 PHX-EHC (D. Ariz. 1985) [hereinafter Aguilar Appellate Brief]. 
186 See infra Section IIIC(2). 
187 See infra Section I II C( 3). 
18' See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 218 and 229. 
189 See, e.g., Aguilar Appellate Brief, supra note 185, at 45 ("fA] defendant who honestly believes, 
however mistakenly, that an alien is entitled to enter and reside in the United States under the 1980 
Refugee Act cannot commit the crime of bringing that alien into the country, nor of illegally trans-
porting or harboring him."). 
190 See, e.g., U.S. v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 1985). In Merkt, the court stated: "We hold 
that the district court properly based its instruction on the well established rule that a citizen is 
presumed to know the law, and that 'ignorance of the law will not excuse.'" Id. 
Igl Aguilar Appellate Brief, supra note 185, at 38. See also infra notes 193-203 and accompanying 
text. 
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rule recognizes ignorance or misunderstanding of the law as a valid defense 
whenever knowledge of the law is made an element of the crime in question. IY2 
In Lambert v. California, 19:, the Supreme Court reviewed a California statute 
which required convicted felons to register in the community within which they 
reside. I94 When a defendant was charged with failure to so register, she claimed 
as a defense that her due process rights had been violated, presumably as a 
result of her ignorance of the statutory law. I95 The Court considered and 
rejected the tenet, "a mistake of law is no defense," reasoning that conviction 
of an ignorant defendant, in this instance, would violate that person's due 
process rights. I'16 
Similarly, in Liparota v. U.S.,IY7 the Supreme Court recognized an analogous 
mistake of law defense when the legislature makes knowledge of the law an 
element of the statute involved. I98 The defendant in Liparota was convicted 
under 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(l) which makes it a crime to knowingly use, transfer, 
acquire, alter, or possess food stamps in an unauthorized manner. 199 The district 
court and the court of appeals held that the knowledge element of the crime 
required only that the defendant realize he was acquiring or purchasing food 
stamps.200 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the statute must be 
construed to reach only those who knew they were acquiring or possessing food 
stamps unlawfuIly.20I 
The Court found reversible error in the district court's refusal to submit an 
instruction requiring the jury to consider whether the prosecution had shown 
that the defendant acquired the food stamps in knowing violation of the law. 202 
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner that knowledge was an element 
10' See, f.[' .• U.S. v. Fierros. 692 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 19H2), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983) 
(ignorance of the law is a defense when knowledge of the law is an "operative [fact] of the crime."). 
1'13355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
1'14 [d. at 226. 
I'; [d. at 226-27. 
19' !d. at 228-30. 
Where a person did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the 
probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process. Were 
it otherwise, the evil would be as great as it is \vhen the law is written in print too fine to read 
or in a language foreign to the community. 
[d. at 227-28. 
1'17 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
198 fd. 
199 !d. at 421. 
'00 [d. at 422. 
~Ol "Absent indication of contrary purpose in the language or legislative history of the statute, we 
believe that § 2024(b)(l) requires a showing that the defendant knew his conduct to be unauthorized 
by statute or regulations." !d. at 425. 
21" [d. at 433. 
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of the offense charged and held that lack of such knowledge, whether by mistake 
or ignorance, constitutes a complete defense.203 
As discussed above, § 1324(a) requires the prosecutor to prove that the de-
fendant knew of the alien's illegal status before he or she can be found in 
violation of the section. 204 A reasonable but mistaken belief that an alien is 
entitled to reside in the United States is arguably similar to the mistake of law 
held to be a valid defense in Liparota.205 
This conclusion is supported by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision 
in Bland v. U.s.20fi The defendants in this case, who brought two Cuban refugees 
into the United States, were charged with violating § 1324(a)(l).207 The defen-
dants argued that they lacked both intent and knowledge to violate the statute 
because they mistakenly believed that the two aliens involved possessed the 
proper entry papers.208 The court acknowledged the defense, stating: 
"[V]iolation [of § I 324(a) ] without knowledge or intent would not constitute the 
offense charged."20Y 
The validity of the defense was reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. 
Fierros.2\o After stating that knowledge of the alien's illegal status is an element 
of § l324(a),211 the court explained how ignorance of the law might serve as a 
valid defense: 
There are ... cases in which a defense of ignorance of the law is 
permitted even though it is not specifically written into the criminal 
statute .... [One such case] involves instances where the defendant 
;(1:1 In footnote nine of the Court's holding, Justice Brennan states: 
The dissent repeatedly claims that our holding today creates a defense of "mistake of law." 
Our holding today no more creates a "mistake of law" defense than does a statute making 
knowing receipt of stolen goods unlawful. In both cases, there is a legal element in the 
definition of the offense. In the case of a receipt-of-stolen-goods statute, the legal element is 
that the goods were stolen; in this case, the legal element is that the "use, transfer. acquisition," 
etc. were in a manner not authorized by statute or regulations. It is not a defense to a charge 
of receipt of stolen goods that one did not know that such receipt was illegal, and it is not a 
defense to a charge of a § 2024(b)(I) violation that one did not know that possessing food 
stamps in a manner unauthorized by statute or regulations was illegal. It is, however, a defense 
to a charge of knowing receipt of stolen goods that one did not know that the goods were 
stolen, just as it is a defense to a charge of a § 2024(b)(I) violation that one did not know that 
one's possession was unauthorized. 
fd. at 440 (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). 
"" See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
~().i See. e.g., ir~fra note 229. 
"'ii 299 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1962). 
Oil; fd. at 106-07. 
""!d. at 107. 
"'" !d. at !O8. 
01"692 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), mi. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983). 
Oil When discussing the knowing and willful elements of § 1324(a), the court noted: "[TIhe first 
requirement of knowledge is that of the status of the alien .... " fd. at 1294. 
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is ignorant of an independently determined legal status or condition 
that is one of the operative facts of the crime.212 
253 
The defendants in this case were convicted of transporting and harboring 
illegal aliens in order to provide local farmers with cheap labor.213 Because the 
defendants' testimony indicated that they were aware of the aliens' status and 
because their only "mistake" was their belief that transporting undocumented 
aliens violated no law, the court was not willing to extend the mistake of law 
defense to cover the defendants' situation. 214 However, the court conceded that 
"[the mistake of law] defense would have been available to [defendants] in this 
case if, for example, they had asserted reasonable grounds to believe that the 
workers were not aliens or that they had been legally admitted to the United States."ZI5 
Thus, if the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the aliens were 
legally entitled to enter the United States, the court would have recognized this 
belief, even if mistaken, as a valid defense. 
While it appeared at the time that the clear language of Fierros had established 
the mistake of law defense in § 1324(a) cases, two later decisions cast doubt on 
the continued validity of the defense. In U.S. v. Merkt (Merkt 1),216 the defendant, 
a sanctuary worker from Texas, was found guilty of two counts of transporting 
illegal aliens.217 The defendant alleged that, while she was aware that the aliens 
whom she assisted had entered the country unofficially, she believed them to 
be refugees, and as such, entitled to enter the United States under the Refugee 
ACt. 218 The court summarily dismissed her defense relying on the "well estab-
lished rule" that ignorance of the law is no excuse.219 The court neither cited 
nor discussed Liparota or Fierros in its opinion. 220 In support of its holding, the 
court cited Lambert v. California, a case which, as noted above, concluded that 
mId. The court further states that "[i]n such a case, the mistake of law is for practical purposes a 
mistake of fact." Id. This is essentially what Justice Brennan is saying in footnote nine of his opinion 
in Liparota. See supra note 203. See also United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(Rubin, J. dissenting in part) ("If 'an apparent 'mistake of law' was actually a 'mistake of fact' in that 
the mistake pertained to a question of legal status .. .' such a mistake constitutes a valid defense."). 
213 Fierros, 692 F.2d at 1292-93. 
214Id. at 1293-95. 
215 !d. at 1294 (emphasis added). 
216 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985). 
217 Merkt was convicted of violating § 1324(a)(2). !d. at 268. 
218 Id. at 270. 
2IY!d. at 273. See supra note 190. 
220 Judge Rubin. in a separate opinion, disagreed with the majority regarding their treatment of the 
actual knowledge issue. "The aphorism that imputes knowledge of the law to all is not applicable if a 
mistaken belief concerning how the law would treat a situation negatives the existence of the mens rea 
essential to the crime charged." !d. at 278. Judge Rubin cited Liparota, Fierros and Bland. Id. See supra 
note 212. 
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in certain cases the "mistake of law is no defense" tenet denies the defendant's 
due process rights. 221 
In U.S. v. Merkt (Merkt II),222 the defendants were convicted of § 1324(a) 
violations arising from a separate incident.223 In footnote eighteen of the opin-
ion, the court dismissed the defendants' mistaken status defense with a direct 
cite to Merkt 1.224 Once more, neither Liparota nor Fierros were considered. 225 
At the time of this writing, U.S. v. Maria del Socorro Pardo de Aguilar,226 the 
"Sanctuary case," is on appeal in the Ninth Circuit.227 In this case, the govern-
ment, after extensive undercover operations, indicted sixteen sanctuary workers 
on various § 1324(a) violations. 228 Once again, the defendants seek to escape 
conviction by asserting that they were unaware of the aliens' illegal status due 
to their good faith belief that the aliens were refugees, and thus entitled to 
enter the United States under the Refugee Act and internationallaw.229 
At the trial level, the government sought to prohibit testimony of mistaken 
belief, claiming that such evidence went to the defendants' motives for acting, 
not to their intent to violate the statute. 230 In its responding order, the District 
221 764 F.2d at 273. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text. 
222 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986). 
223 Id. at 953-54. 
224 !d. at 965 n.18 and accompanying text. 
225 [d. 
226 V.S. v. Maria del Socorro Pardo de Augilar, No. CR 85-008 PHX-EHC (D. Ariz. 1985). 
227 Interview with Michael Altman, attorney for the Defendants (jan. 7, 1988). 
228 The Boston Globe, Jan. 27, 1985, at I, col. I. The investigation, code named "operation sojour-
ner." began in March 1984. Colbert, supra note 113, at 44 n.206. The government employed two 
undercover agents and two paid informants. !d. These individuals infiltrated church meetings held by 
sanctuary workers and collected enough information to enable a Grand .I ury to return indictments 
against 16 sanctuary workers. [d. 
229 See Aguilar Appellate Brief, supra note 185, at 33-34,77 & n.44. The Court would later exclude 
evidence of international law as inapplicable. Court Order of October 25, 1985, at 3, Aguilar, No. CR 
85-008 PHX-EXC [hereinafter Aguilar Court Order of Oct. 25, 1985]. 
230 Government's Memoranda in Support of Motion in Limine, Aguilar, No. CR 85-008 PHX-EHC. 
The district court echoed this contention in its pretrial order of October 28th: "No evidence will be 
received[l]offered to establish good or bad motive on the part of a defendant or defendants." Court 
Summary Order of October 28, 1985, Aguilar, No. CR 85-008 PHX-EHC [hereinafter Aguilar Court 
Summary Order]. Similarly, in an instruction to the jury, the court stated: 
Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is that which prompts a per§on to act. 
Intent refers to the state of mind with which the art is done. 
Personal advancement, financial gain, political reason, religious beliefs, moral convictions 
or some adherence to a higher law even of nations are well recognized motives of human conduct 
So, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts constituting the crime charged were 
committed by the defendant with the intent to commit the unlawful act and bring about the 
prohibited result, then the requirement that the act b'e done knowingly or willfully ... has 
been satisfied even though the defendant may have believed that his conduct was politically, 
religiously or morally required, or that the ultimate good would result from such conduct. 
Jury Instruction No. 47, Aguilar, No. CR 85-008 PHX-EHC (emphasis added). 
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Court for the District of Arizona did not dispute the defendants' contention 
that ignorance of an alien's legal status is a valid defense when that knowledge 
is an operative fact of the crime.231 Rather, the court held that the defendants' 
reliance on the Refugee Act was improper because only the Attorney General 
is authorized to make such status determinations.232 Therefore, the district court 
refused to consider the defendants' mistaken belief regarding the aliens' legal 
status because of the incorrect process by which that status determination was 
made. 2:l :l This ruling ignores that mistaken belief regarding an alien's statl1S, 
regardless of the validity of its derivation, is the very premise of the defense. 234 
On appeal, the defendants seek to make it clear that regardless of the propriety 
of their reliance on the Refugee Act, their good faith belief that the refugees 
were entitled to enter the United States precludes a finding of the requisite 
intent to violate § 1324(a).235 
3. Entitlement to Enter 
Santuary workers contend not only that they believe in good faith that the 
aliens whom they assist are entitled to enter the United States, but further, they 
contend that this belief is correct. Thus, relying on the Protocol of 1967 and 
the Refugee Act amendments to § 243(h), as well as various international doc-
uments and norms which provide for non-refoulement, sanctuary workers claim 
However. drawing lines between ITlotive and intent is often nothing more than a gatne of semantics. 
The only way to determine the [Sanctuary 1 Workers' intent in offering safety to these aliens 
is to examine [their] motives. Any attempt to separate intent from motive would be artificial 
and contrary to statutory requirements; the statute itself requires a sll~jective examination of 
the state of mind of the accused harborer, rather t han a mechanical, objective determination 
merely of whether the act was committed. 
Helton, mpra note 2. at 563. 
According to the Supreme Court in U.S. v. U.S. Gypswn Co., "ultimately the decision on the issue of 
intent must be left to the trier of fact alone." 438 u.S. 422, 446 (1978). 
Thus, it was arguablv improper for the district court to take this issue from the jurv in pretrial 
proceedings. See generally Colbert, supra note 113. 
231 Court Order of October 28, 1985, at 1-2. Aguilar, No. CR 85·008 PHX·EHC [hereinafter Aguilar 
Court Order of Oct. 28, 1985]. 
232 See Aguilar Court Order of Oct. 28, 1985, supra note 231. at 2-3; Aguilar Court Order of Oct. 
25, 1985, supra note 229, at 3. 
23:l Aguilar Appellate Brief, sul,ra note 185. at 52. 
The trial court ruled that a good faith defense exists under § 1324 only to the extent that a 
defendant believes (a) that the person he assists is not an alien or (b) that the alien entered 
the United States legally. The court thereby drew a distinction tbat accepts some mental state 
defenses based on a misunderstanding of the law while illogically rejecting others. 
Id. (record cites omitted). 
23< [d. at 46 n.25. 
mId. at 53-55. 
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that any alien qualifying as a refugee pursuant to article 1(2) of the Protocol is 
legally entitled to enter the United States.236 Accordingly, they argue that 
§ l324(a) is inapplicable because no illegal aliens are being brought in, trans-
ported, or harbored. 237 
a. Official Status 
The sanctuary workers' entitlement defense has met with little success pri-
marily due to the aliens' lack of official refugee status. Thus far, the courts 
presented with this defense have refused to hold that the Refugee Act or 
international law provides the refugee with an automatic right to enter the 
United States.2:lH Instead, they have concluded that only the Attorney General 
has the authority to give such entitlement.239 
In U.S. v. Elder240 the respondent was arrested for transporting three "un-
documented" aliens in violation of § 1324(a)(2). Elder maintained that the aliens 
were refugees under the terms of the Refugee Act, and thus, rightfully in the 
country under § 243(h) of the Refugee Act. 241 The district court rejected this 
argument stating that an alien is not legally in the country until he or she has 
submitted an application for asylum with the INS.242 Further, the court held 
that neither Elder nor the court was authorized to determine the status of an 
alien; that determination, they said, could only be made by the Attorney Gen-
era!.2J3 
This holding was affirmed by the district court in U.S. v. Aguilar.244 The 
defendants in Aguilar argued that the language of § 1324(a) made the deter-
mination of refugee status dependent upon all appropriate immigration law, 
2'" See, e.g., U.S. v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1576 (S.D. Tex. 1985) ("Elder considers these persons 
'refugees' under the Refugee Act of 1980 ... and international law."). 
'3, Of course, a § 1324(a) violation cannot be made out if the alien is not illegally in the country. 
See, e.fr, United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266, 270 (5th Cir. 1985) ("To establish a violation of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324(a)(2), the government must prove that ... the alien was in the United States in violation of the 
law .... "). 
23R See, e.g., United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 964 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1603 
(1987) (the court rejected the defendants' Protocol argument by resort to precedent, and their Refugee 
Act argument by reliance upon Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 425-
26 (1984) which held that the Protocol did not expand existing domestic immigration law); Aguilar 
Court Order of Oct. 25, 1985, supra note 229, at 2-3. 
"" See infra notes 243, 248 and accompanying text. 
240 GOI F. Supp at 1576. 
'·11 [d. at 1580. 
'" "Fifth circuit law clearly holds that before Salvadoran aliens may reside legally within this country 
thev must submit applications for asylum with the Government." [d. 
""Id. at 1580-8l. 
24' Aguilar Court Order of Oct. 25, 1985, supra note 229, at 2-3. 
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including the Protocol and the Refugee Act of 1980.245 In support of their 
position, the defendants cite the final clause of § 1324(a) which makes the 
determination of legal status dependent upon due admission by an immigration 
officer or by entitlement "to enter or reside within the United States under the 
terms of this Chapter or any other law relating to the immigration or expulsion of 
aliens .... "246 
The district court disagreed with the defendant's argument, ruling that the 
U.S. accession to the Protocol did not provide additional grounds by which an 
alien might be admitted into the United States.247 Therefore, the court held 
that the only process of legal entry available to a refugee is submission of an 
application to the INS.248 In a later pretrial order, the court went still further. 
After reaffirming that the Protocol did not entitle aliens to enter or reside in 
the United States without authorization from the Attorney General, the court 
ruled: 
[T]he mere possibility that aliens could file asylum applications at 
some time in the future and thus [be] allowed to remain at liberty 
while their right to asylum was determined does not make them, 
from the time they enter the country, entitled to "reside" in the 
country for the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a).249 
These holdings can be criticized on two grounds. First, the 1951 Convention, 
which the United States acceded to by incorporation in the Protocol, recognizes 
the urgent need which drives refugees from their homeland to seek refuge 
abroad.250 Thus, article 31(1) prohibits a host state from imposing penalties 
245 Aguilar Appellate Brief, supra note 185, at 73. 
To come within the statute's definition of entitlement, the alien must be "lawfully entitled to 
enter or reside within the United States under the terms of this chapter or any other law 
relating to the immigration or expulsion of aliens," 8 U.S.c. § 1324(a). 
The defense pointed to two legal bases upon which the aliens they allegedly assisted were 
entitled to enter or reside in the United States: the 1980 Refugee Act and the principle of 
international refugee law. 
!d. 
246 [d. See 8 U.s.C. § 1324 (1982) (emphasis added). 
247 See Aguilar Court Order of Oct. 25, 1985, supra note 229, at 2 (citing Immigration and Natural-
ization Service v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425-26 (1984». See infra note 259. 
248 Aguilar Court Order of Oct. 25, 1985, supra note 229, at 3. Of course, presentation to an 
immigration officer would only guarantee the refugee a temporary stay, usually in a detention camp, 
while his or her application is being processed by the INS. See Helton, supra note 3, at 256-59. 
249 See Aguilar Court Order of Oct. 28, 1985, supra note 23 I, at 2. 
250 The Secretary General of the United Nations recognized that "a refugee whose departure from 
his country of origin is usually a flight, is rarely in a position to comply with the requirements of legal 
entry ... into the country of refuge." He thus recommended that the convention officially recognize 
such aliens as bona fide refugees. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Jan. 3, 1950, 
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upon those refugees who have unofficially crossed the border.25t The article 
preserves the aliens' right to refugee status provided they present themselves 
to the proper authorities "without delay."252 According to the Secretary General 
of the U.N., "[aJ refugee who presents himself to the authorities of the country 
of asylum, after crossing the border clandestinely, would thus be recognized as 
a bona fide refugee."253 In the interim, the refugee would be entitled to the 
protection of non-refoulement pending final determination of his or her status.254 
This urgency argument, however, is susceptible to narrow construction. Ar-
guably, getting in touch with the "proper authorities" is not the highest priority 
of the newly arrived refugees. Often, these refugees have suffered unspeakable 
persecutions in their own countries, and their primary concern is with the needs 
of the mind and body.255 Aliens in this situation might possibly forfeit their 
status as refugees for failing the "without delay" requirement. Consequently, 
the sanctuary worker would also lose his or her defense because the alien could 
no longer be considered legally in the territory. There is some support, however, 
for the proposition that an alien in this situation is still entitled to the protection 
of non-refoulement in the host state, based upon the legal effect of article 33.256 
U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/2, at 46 (1950). 
According to article 31(1) of the 1951 Convention: 
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, 
on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened 
... enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present 
themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or 
presence. 
1951 Convention, supra note 12, at art. 31(1) (as incorporated in the Protocol of 1967, supra note 63, 
at arts. 1(1)-(3». When acceding to the Protocol of 1967, the United States recorded two reservations, 
neither of which affect the application of article 31 (I). Annex: Ratifications, accessions, prorogations, 
etc., concerning treaties and international agreements registered with the secretariat of the United 
J',;ations, 1968,649 U.N.T.S. 372. See aLIO 114 CONGo REC. 27844, 29391 (1968). 
"I 1951 Convention, supra note 12, at art. 31(1) (as incorporated in the Protocol of 1967, supra note 
63. at arts. 1(1)-(3». 
2"'/d. 
"3 Ad Hoc Committff on Statelessness and Related Prohlems, Jan. 3, 1950, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/2, at 46 
(1950). 
254 According to the United Nation's HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING 
REFUGEE STATUS: 
A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfils [sic 1 
the criteria contained in the definition. This would necessarily occnr prior to the time at 
which his refugee status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does not 
therefore make a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because 
of recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee. 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND 
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 9 (1979). See aLIO G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 159 
(because formal channels of recognition are often "overburdened" in cases of mass influx, "the benefit 
of Article 31 is due to the broad class of bona fide asylum-seekers ... pending formal determination, 
if any, of refugee status."). 
'" Coleman, Political Pandemic, 15 STUD. LAW. 6, 6 (Dec. 1986). See supra note 115. 
250 See infra notes 257-67 and accompanying text. Sa aLw Helton, supra note 2, at 509 n.52 (quoting 
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The second criticism of the Elder and Aguilar decisions turns upon the legal 
effect of article 33.257 The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States provides: "Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to inter-
national law and to international agreements of the United States, except that 
a 'non-self-executing' agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence 
of necessary implementation."258 Thus, the courts may continue to interpret 
article 33 in conformity with the more restrictive provisions of the INA only if 
it is non-self-executing.259 If article 33 is self-executing, however, then the courts 
are obligated to execute the provision as directed by its language.2tiO Arguably, 
this would give all aliens who qualify as refugees under article 1(2) of the 
Protocol automatic entitlement to enter a state of refuge despite their lack of 
legal status.261 
For a number of reasons, article 33 of the Convention appears to be self-
executing. First, the article does not use "conditional or prospective" language 
which is commonly found in non-self-executing agreements.262 Second, the 
Stephan, United States' Policy Towards Undocumented Salvadorans, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, Order Brief 
IB8136, at 3) (U.S. failure "to grant asylum to any signific;mt number of Salvadorans, coupled with 
continuing large-scale forcible and voluntary return to El Salvador would appear to represent a 
negation of [United States'] responsibilities [under the] Protocol."). 
257 Instruments that expect an "obligation of conduct," which are most often self-executing treaties, 
require the signing state "to amend, rescind or nullify any laws or regulations" contrary to the purposes 
of the international instrument. G. GOODWIN-GILl" supra note 2, at 141 (quoting language from the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature March 7, 
1966, art, 2(1)(c), 660 U,N,TS, 195, a self-executing agreement), On the other hand, instruments that 
expect an "obligation of result," which are most often non-self-executing treaties, require simple 
compliance, leaving the means of implementation with the individual state, Id, at 141-42, Arguably, 
signatories of instruments which only require an obligation of result are not obligated to remove or 
change any domestic laws as long as they are not enforced in such a way as to produce results contrary 
to the purpose of the agreement. [d, at 143, See infra note 272, 
258 RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, at § Ill. According to the Restatement, an international agreement 
of the United States is only non-self-executing when (1) the agreement "manifests an intention" not 
to be effective until the enactment of implementing legislation, (2) the Senate or Congress requires 
implementing legislation as a condition to consent, or (3) implementing legislation is constitutionally 
required, [d, See aLw id, at comments h, i, 
259 This view was espoused bv the House of Representatives in their report on the Refugee Act of 
1980: 
[M]erely because an individual or group of refugees comes within the definition [of refugee 
found within the Refugee Act] will not guarantee resettlement in the United States, The 
Committee is of the opinion that the new definition does not create a new and expanded 
means of entry, but instead regularizes and formalizes the policies and the practices that bave 
been followed in recent years, 
H.R, REP, No, 96-608, 96th Cong" 1st Sess, 10 (1979), 
260 Frolova v, U,S,S,R" 761 F,2d 370, 373 (7th CiL 1985), 
261 See supra notes 57, 71 and accompanying text. 
262 Helton, supra note 2, at 509, See, e,g" Sei Fujii v, State, 38 Cal. 718, 722-25 (1952) (certain articles 
of the U,N, Charter were held not to be self~executing because their language lacked a "mandatory 
quality and definiteness, , , ,"), Article 33 demands that no slate "shall" expel a refugee, See supra text 
accompanying note 58, 
260 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XII, No.1 
Convention requires adoption of the article without reservation.263 Finally, U.S. 
accession to the Protocol in 1968 made the agreement the "supreme law of the 
Land,"264 supporting the conclusion that the United States is legally bound by 
the Protocol, and thus, the non-refoulement provision.265 In concert, these three 
elements support the conclusion that article 33 is self-executing.266 Therefore, 
aliens are arguably entitled to refugee status, non-refoulement, and temporary 
refuge in the host country notwithstanding their unofficial status.267 This being 
the case, sanctuary workers are not in violation of the law when they assist these 
refugees. 
b. Sovereign Right 
A further reason why courts have refused to recognize the entitlement de-
fense is the conflict it creates with the sovereign authority of the United States. 
In Elder, the respondent argued that his actions were sanctioned by international 
law, asserting that "international laws and treaties automatically entitle the aliens 
to receive refugee status without regard to our own nationallaws."268 The court 
declined to answer the issue raised. Instead, after affirming the Attorney Gen-
eral's exclusive authority to designate the status of refugees, the court declared: 
"[We] cannot interfere with political decisions which the United States as a 
sovereign nation chooses to make in the interpretation, enforcement, or rejec-
tion of treaty commitments which affect immigration."269 
Similarly, the court in Merkt II refused to acknowledge any international 
limitations upon the sovereignty of the United States. When urged by amici to 
provide legal status for refugees based upon international norms, the court 
"'" SfF supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
'hI L·.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
,,;', q: RESTATEMENT. supra note 97, at § III comment d ("Customary international law, while not 
mentioned explicitly in the Supremacy Clause, [is] also federal law and as such [is] supreme over State 
law."). 
";h The I NS itself has ruled that the Protocol of 1967 "being self-executing, has the force and effect 
of an act of Congress." In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 313 (1973) (the court held, however, that 
there were no facts to support the petitioner's claim that he would face persecution if sent back to 
Hungary). 
However. according to the district court in Aguilar, "[i]t is well established that the 1967 United 
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is not self-executing and thus does not afford 
aliens any rights eni()rceable in courts of the United States." Aguilar Court Order of Oct. 25, 1985, 
",pm note 229. at 2. In support, the court cites Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982) 
("In concluding that the Refugee Act of 1980 was designed ... to bring the United States into 
compliance with the Protocol, we indicated that the Protocol's provisions were not themselves a source 
of right under our law unless and until Congress implemented them by appropriate legislation. "), and 
Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey. 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1406 (D. D.C. 1985) ("The United Nations 
Protocol is not self~executing."). fri. 
:?li7 Sp(' supm note 254. 
,,;~ (iOI F. Supp. 1074, 1581 (S.D. Tex. 19H5). 
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responded: "In enacting our refugee statute ... Congress was not bound by 
international law, much less purported 'custom' of internationallaw."27o 
The sovereign right of the United States to determine its immigration policy 
is firmly established.271 As part of the international community and as a signatory 
to some of its laws, however, the United States is obligated to respect those 
international treaties which it has ratified, as well as international legal norms.272 
If sovereign authority allows a state to alter its recognition of international 
obligations according to the needs of the moment, "then the refugee'S status in 
international law is denied and the standing, authority, and effectiveness of the 
principles and institutions of protection are seriously undermined."273 
Whenever possible, the United States is obligated to construe its domestic law 
in a way that does not conflict with customary international law. 274 While the 
authority of a sovereign to expel or exclude aliens is undeniable, it does have 
its limits.275 When domestic law is used to deny basic human rights, these limits 
have been exceeded. 276 
270 794 F.2d 950, 964 n.16 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1603 (1987). 
271 See Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ("There is no power in this Court to declare 
null and void a statute adopted by Congress ... merely on the ground that such provision violates a 
principle of international law."). 
272 "[A]n act of congress [sic] ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other 
possible construction remains .... " Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804). See RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, at § 114 ("When fairly possible, a United States statute is to 
be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the 
United States."); Goldman & Martin, supra note 16, at 318: 
[T]he very fact that the United States has signed but not ratified certain conventions also 
creates certain legal obligations. Under an authoritative principle of treaty law, a state. on 
signing a treaty, is obligated to refrain from acts which could defeat the object and purpose 
of the treaty until that state makes clear its intention not to become a party to it. 
[d. See also supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text. 
273 G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 99. 
274 See supra note 272. 
275 Shaugnessey v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) ("Courts have long recognized the power to 
expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute .... "). But see Ad Hoc Committee on 
Statelessness and Related Problems, Jan. 3,1950, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/2, at 45-56: 
!d. 
The sovereign right of a state to remove or keep from its territory foreigners regarded as 
undesirable cannot be challenged. Nevertheless, expulsion or non-admittance at the frontier 
are serious measures in any event; they are especially serious in the case of a refugee who 
cannot be sent back to his country of origin and whom no other state can be compelled to 
accept. There is little likelihood that a foreign country will consent to receive a refugee whose 
expulsion has been ordered and who is stamped as an undesirable .... Caught between two 
sovereign orders, one ordering him to leave the country and the other forbidding his entry 
into the neighboring country, he leads the life of an outlaw and may in the end become a 
public danger. 
In this way measures of expulsion or non-admittance at the frontier, intended to protect 
law and order, achieve apposite results when an attempt is made to apply them to refugees 
without taking into account their peculiar position. 
276 "Sovereignty and control of immigration are important, but they cannot justify the excesses that 
have been employed in the name of American immigration policy. Even if aliens in exclusion and 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The above discussion of the Sanctuary Movement, and the attending issues 
of immigration law, is necessarily narrow in scope. However, to consider the 
Central American refugee crisis a problem easily addressed is erroneous. Sanc-
tuary workers have acted admirably, often at great cost to themselves, in order 
to attend to the immediate needs of a few Central American refugees. None-
theless, a permanent and effective solution can only be devised after candid, 
humane, and forethoughtful consideration of the problem by the U.S. govern-
ment. 277 
Immigration from Central and South America has reached an alarming rate. 
With this mass influx of people come complex issues of health care, economics, 
unemployment, civil rights, and crime.278 These issues must be analyzed care-
fully, and feasible solutions must be integrated into an immigration policy which 
will address the immediate needs of these refugees, and anticipate the future 
needs and concerns of the refugees, border communities, the INS, and the U.S. 
government. 
The U.S. government has spent far too much of its time and resources 
splitting hairs over such hypertechnical issues as the definition of a refugee, 
likelihood of persecution, etc., all in an effort to circumvent the spirit and intent 
of the Protocol, the Refugee Act, and immigration law generally. Instead, the 
government must focus its efforts on the development of a well-studied and 
socially responsible immigration policy which frankly addresses the issues and 
concerns of the parties involved. Such a policy would be open to debate and 
refinement, resulting in a fair immigration policy which would insure consistent 
court treatment and due process for the refugee and respect for U.S. sover-
eignty. 
The history of sanctuary in the United States demonstrates that the Movement 
will only surface when the government has failed to address adequately a 
situation of vital human concern.279 The selfless efforts of the Sanctuary Move-
deportation have only narrowly-defined rights under U.S. law, it is undeniable that they posses certain 
basic human rights." Helton, supra note 2, at 600. 
277 Cj. Helton, supra note 2, at 500. 
278 See, e.g., Comment, Immigration Laws Excluding Aliens on the Basis of Health: A Reassessment after 
AIDS, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 85 (1986); Dallek, Health Care for Undocumented Immigrants: A Story of Neglect, 
14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 407 (1980); Simon, Nine Myths About Immigration, IMMIGR. J., July-Sep. 1985, 
at 3; Kanter & Banoff, Dependents, Illegal Aliens and the New Tax Act, 66 J. TAXIN. 192 (1987); Furin, 
Immigration Law: Alien Employment Certification, 16 INT'L LAW. 111 (1982); Comment, Equal Protection: 
Can California Offer More for Undocumented Alien Children?, 16 PAC. L.J. 1101 (1985); Comment, A 
Human Rights Approach to the Labor Rights of Undocumented Workers, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1715 (1986); Hull, 
Undocumented Alirn Children and Free Public Education: An analysis of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 
409 (1983). 
27Y See Helton, supra note 2, at 550-53. 
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ment to assume the government's social responsibility to the Central American 
refugee is indeed laudable. The time has long passed, however, for the rightful 
bearers of refugee policy to return to their obligation. The longer the govern-
ment shirks its responsibilities, the more dearly the Central American refugee 
will have to pay. 
Joseph F. Riga 
